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Abstract 
 Risk analysis plays a key role in managing the detrimental effects of infrastructure 
failures to the United States.  Currently, the Department of Homeland Security risk 
equation measures the individual risk of each individual portion of infrastructure.  This 
research effort proposes a modified risk equation that incorporates the traditional 
elements of individual risk and the system elements of risk.  The modified equation 
proposes two additional variables:  Spatial Relationship and Coupling Effect.  Three 
scholarly articles are presented to show the development of both variables and 
comparison between the traditional and modified method.  The modified equation has 
three benefits:  system effects are incorporated into the current equation, the equation 
provides more fidelity and minimizes additional data, and the additional data is easily 
executed.  
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A SPATIAL RISK ANALYSIS OF OIL REFINERIES IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
I.  Introduction 
“Protecting and ensuring the resiliency of the critical infrastructure and 
key resources (CIKR) of the United States is essential to the Nation’s 
security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of life.  
Attacks on CIKR could significantly disrupt the functioning of the 
government and business alike and produce effects far beyond the targeted 
sector and physical location of the incident (Chertoff, 2009).” 
 
A risk analysis methodology is necessary to manage potential effects of oil 
refinery outages to the increasingly connected, interdependent critical infrastructure of 
the United States.  The monetary costs of the September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11), 
Hurricane Katrina, and Deepwater Horizon oil accident are estimated at $110 billion, $81 
billion, and $40 billion, respectively (Berg, 2009; Knabb, Rhome, & Brown, 2005; 
Thompson, 2002).  Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the lack of a critical 
infrastructure risk mitigation strategy was identified as an area for improvement (Bush, 
2003).  In both the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina, cascading failures occurred due to 
the interdependencies between infrastructures and spatial relationships of the 
infrastructure. Understanding, conceptualizing, and analyzing risk will provide the 
decision and policy-making process better information in order to protect critical 
infrastructure across the United States.  Additionally, Congress has a strong interest in the 
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risk, interdependency, and vulnerability of critical infrastructure to natural hazards, 
accidents or terrorism (Parformak, 2007).    
Problem Statement 
“Critical infrastructure is so vital to the United States that its incapacity would harm 
the nation’s physical security, economic security, or public health” (Parformak, 2007).   
Understanding the uncertainty involved with events that could shut down the petroleum 
industry can help us make better decisions to manage risk to the government, people, and 
economy.  Furthermore, the U.S. military is dependent on oil refining capability and a 
major shortage could potentially have devastating effects on mission accomplishment.  
As a result, a need has emerged to better quantify the risks associated with disasters to 
critical infrastructure within the United States.   The components of the current tools only 
measure individual risks associated with each part of the system and do not look at 
impacts to the entire system.   The problem statement is how can a process and technique 
be developed to account for individual and systematic risks of the oil refinery system? 
Research Objectives 
The overarching goal of this study is to establish a process and develop techniques 
that can be expanded to look at the risk to both the critical infrastructure system and 
critical components of the system. The establishment of a risk methodology will answer 
key questions like: 
• What are the components of risk to the oil refining infrastructure? 
• Where are the critical nodes and are they vulnerable to the same event? 
• How are the nodes within the infrastructure tied to other critical infrastructures? 
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• How does this infrastructure system impact the Air Force and military? 
Limitations 
 This research used data that were compiled from public government records and 
public sources. Oil production characteristics were compiled from the United States 
Energy Information Administration.  The oil production data were assumed to be 
complete, current, and accurate.  Types of distillation were not accounted for in the 
production characteristics.  The hurricane probability data were retrieved from National 
Ocean and Atmospheric Administration.  The data utilized were based on current year 
conditions and current temperatures.   
Overview 
This thesis is presented in the scholarly article format.  The second chapter 
presents the first conference paper which was accepted and presented at the 2011 
WorldCOMP International Conference on Security and Management.  This article 
outlines the grounds for development of the spatial relationship and coupling effect 
elements.  The third chapter is the second conference paper which was accepted for 
presentation at the 2012 Western Decision Sciences Institute.  This article confirms 
statistically the existence of the spatial relationship of oil refineries.  The fourth chapter is 
the journal article produced from the research, which was submitted to the Risk Analysis 
Journal.   This article outlines the methodology to incorporate a spatial relationship and 
coupling effect into the risk equation and discusses the use of geographic information 
systems tools.  Finally, the fifth chapter offers a final discussion of the article conclusions 
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along with pertinent findings and future research.      The appendices include an expanded 
literature review, methodology, and results.   
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II. Scholarly Article 
Accepted and Presented at the 2011 WorldCOMP International Security and 
Management Conference 
A Spatial Risk of Oil Refineries within the United States  
Zachary L. Schiff and William E. Sitzabee, Ph.D., P.E. 
Abstract 
A risk analysis methodology is necessary to manage potential effects of oil 
refinery outages to the increasingly connected, interdependent critical infrastructure of 
the United States. This paper outlines an approach to develop a risk analysis methodology 
that incorporates spatial and coupling elements in order to develop a better understanding 
of risk. The methodology proposed in this paper utilizes a three phase approach to look at 
both natural disaster and terrorist risk.  Understanding the uncertainty involved with the 
events that could shut down the petroleum energy sector enables decision makers to make 
better decisions in order to manage risk to the government, people, and economy. 
Keywords:  Geographic Information Systems (GIS), Risk Analysis, Oil Refineries, 
Petroleum Industry, Critical Infrastructure, Auto-Correlation, Coupling, Spatial 
Relationships 
Paper type: Full paper 
Introduction 
In the past decade, the United States has experienced first-hand the devastating 
impacts of disasters, both natural and terrorist, to critical infrastructure.  The events of the 
September 11, 2001 attacks (9/11); Hurricanes Ike, Katrina, and Rita; and British 
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Petroleum’s Deep Horizon oil accident illustrate the effects of a major disaster to the 
United States.   The monetary costs of 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, and Deep Horizon oil 
accident are estimated at $110 billion, $81 billion, and $40 billion, respectively [1]-[3].    
The nation’s security, economy, and health are dependent on critical infrastructure to 
provide key services in order for the government, people, and businesses to function 
properly.    
During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, refinery capability was reduced 13 percent 
and 14 percent, correspondingly.  Due to reduced capacity, the hurricanes influenced gas 
prices to rise from $1.10 to $2.55 after the disasters [4].  The cost is an increase that has 
not been recovered from and has contributed to the economic recession.  In addition, 
increased petroleum demand in the past 20 years has increased at a faster rate than 
refining capability to provide gas, diesel, and other petroleum products.  According to 
GAO-09-87, refineries are producing at a level very near their maximum capacity across 
the United States [5].  As a result, a disaster, either natural or terrorist, could potentially 
result in large shortages for a given time period. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) fuel costs represented nearly 1.2 percent of 
total DoD spending during Fiscal Year 2000 and increased to nearly 3.0 percent by Fiscal 
Year 2008 [6].  Andrews [6] stated that over the same period, total defense spending 
doubled and fuel costs increased 500 percent from $3.6 billion to $17.9 billion.  Nearly 
97.7 billion barrels of jet fuel were consumed in FY2008 and represents nearly 71 percent 
of all fuel purchased by the DoD.  According to the Air Force Infrastructure Energy Plan, 
the fuel bill for the Air Force exceeds $10 million dollars per day and every $10 per 
barrel fuel price increase drives costs up $600 million dollars per year [7].  In 2007, the 
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Air Force spent $67.7 million on ground fuel energy and consumed 31.2 million gallons 
of petroleum.  The ground fuel energy only accounts for four percent of all fuel costs [7].   
The military is a large customer of oil refinery products and is dependent on petroleum to 
complete military operations.   
In the past decade, the petroleum industry has experienced several examples of 
cascading failures, including Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.  These experiences can 
provide useful data with regards to outages and consequences of the events.  Integrating 
spatial analysis into the research provides two opportunities to advance risk management:  
1) utilize spatial tools to analyze relationships that provide insight into how the system 
functions and 2) visually identify trends that are not obvious within data analysis.  This 
paper outlines an approach to develop a modified risk equation incorporating 
interdependency and spatial relationships utilizing critical infrastructure analysis and 
geographical information systems and sciences.   
Background 
Critical Infrastructure 
 The USA Patriot Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56 Section 1016e) contains the federal 
government’s definition of critical infrastructure.  It stated that critical infrastructure is 
the “set of systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States 
that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating 
impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or the 
combination of those matters.”  The National Strategy for Homeland Security categorized 
critical infrastructure into 13 different sectors and they are as follows:  Agriculture, Food, 
Water, Public Health, Emergency Services, Government, Defense Industrial Base, 
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Information and Telecommunications, Energy, Transportation, Banking and Finance, 
Chemical Industry and Hazardous Materials, and Postal and Shipping [8]. 
 Approximately 85 percent of the national infrastructure is owned by private 
industry [9].  The relationship between government and private industry is complicated 
with the government acting as both regulator and consumer.  This is especially true 
within the energy sector which is composed of electrical power, oil, and gas 
infrastructure [10].  The energy sector is connected physically and virtually to all other 
sectors and has been shown to cause cascading failures to other sectors.   
 The petroleum industry was split into five Petroleum Administration for Defense 
Districts (PADDs) based on geographic location during WWII [11].  Parformak [12] 
discussed geographic concentration of critical infrastructure across numerous sectors and 
policy methods for encouraging dispersion.  Specifically, Texas and Louisiana (PADD 2) 
refineries account for over 43 percent of the total United States refining capacity [12].  
Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly [13] discussed interdependencies, coupling and response 
behavior, and types of failures with respect to critical infrastructure across the United 
States.    
Risk Analysis Methods 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) introduced the risk function as a 
combination of threat, vulnerability, and consequence, displayed below as Equation (1) 
[14].  Lowrance [15] introduced risk as a measure of the probability and severity of 
adverse effects.  Chertoff [14] defined threat as a natural or manmade occurrence that has 
the potential to harm life, operations, or property; vulnerability as the physical feature 
9 
that renders an entity open to exploitation; and consequence as the effect and loss 
resulting from event. 
Risk= f (Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence)                           (1) 
Solano [16] investigated vulnerability assessment methods for determining risk of 
critical infrastructure and spatial distribution appeared to be an area where research can 
be expanded.    Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly [13] discussed the challenges of 
modeling multiple interdependent infrastructures due to volume of data required and that 
isolation of infrastructure does not adequately analyze behavior of the system.  Ahearne 
[17] discussed the appropriateness of the multiplicative use of the risk function and found 
that it is generally accepted for natural disasters.  Chai, Liu, et al. [18] utilized a social 
network analysis to evaluate the relationship between infrastructure risk and 
interdependencies.  The study utilized a node and arc approach to determine the number 
of in and out degrees to show dependencies and coupling.  Expanding this approach 
could potentially result in better quantification of coupling effects on critical 
infrastructure. 
Mohtadi [19] presented extreme value analysis as a method to predict large-scale 
terrorism events.  In the study, methods for measuring terrorism as a probabilistic risk 
were developed for terrorism risk which is extreme and occurs infrequently.  Paté-Cornell 
and Guikema [20] presented a model that utilized risk analysis, decision analysis and 
elements of game theory to account for both the probabilities of scenario and objectives 
between the terrorists and United States.  In their research, the importance of utilizing a 
multi-source method for collecting data on terrorism risk which includes expert opinion, 
output of other system analysis, and statistics from past events.  Leung, Lambert and 
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Mosenthal [21] utilized the risk filtering, ranking, and management (RFRM) and 
Hierarchal Holographic Modeling (HHM) to conduct a multi-level analysis of protecting 
bridges against terrorist attacks. 
Geographic Information Systems Spatial Tools 
Nearly 40 years ago, Tobler [22] stated that “nearly everything is related to 
everything else, but near things are more related than distant things.”  This became 
Tobler’s First Law of Geography and is acknowledged as the foundation of geographic 
information systems and science.  Longley, Goodchild, Maguire, and Rind [23] discussed 
spatial autocorrelation as a tool that allows us to describe the interrelatedness of events 
and relationships that exist across space.  Griffith [24] discussed spatial autocorrelation as 
“a dependency exists between values of a variable…or a systematic pattern in values of a 
variable across the locations on a map due to underlying common factors.” 
Methodology 
The goal of this study is to establish a process and develop techniques that can be 
expanded to look at the risk to both the critical infrastructure system and critical  
components of the system.  This is a three-phase study and is organized in the following 
manner: 1) assess and compile inventory of assets, risk components, and characteristics; 
2) validate the natural disaster quantitative risk model with spatial and coupling effects, 
and 3) qualitatively assess terrorism risk utilizing coefficients from the quantitative 
model.    Figure 2-1 shows the research process and provides an outline of the phase 
progression. 
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Figure 2-1: Overview of Research Phases and Risk Analysis Methodologies 
The first phase analyzed the factors that contribute to risk, the data available to 
characterize infrastructure, and the methodologies that are currently used to quantify risk.  
This paper presents the first phase of the study, which resulted in the identification of two 
additional variables:  1) spatial relationship and 2) coupling effect.  Equation (2) shows 
the modified risk equation which is the focus of phase II and phase III.   
Risk=f (Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence, Spatial Relationship, Coupling Effect)  (2) 
The goal of the second phase is to better quantify the cumulative risk of cascading 
failures by including the spatial relationship and coupling effects.  To determine the 
spatial relationship, spatial auto-correlation will be utilized to develop a quantitative 
relationship of distance between critical infrastructures.   The coupling effect will utilize 
a node-arc analysis to determine the number of connections to other infrastructures and 
expand on the research effort by Chai, Lui, et al. [18].  Natural disaster data will be 
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utilized to develop a case study to compare the results of the second phase to already 
established and validated methods of quantifying risk.   
The third and final phase of this research is to utilize the spatial and coupling 
effect information to qualitatively assess terrorism risk.  This phase will include 
phenomenological methods which will be utilized to interview experts in the terrorism 
field in order to develop threat and vulnerability data for petroleum infrastructure.  The 
combination of results from the second and third phases will provide the foundation to 
complete a qualitative terrorism risk assessment.  The goal of the third phase is to 
determine the highest terrorism risk to oil refinery infrastructure that could potentially 
result in cascading failures and large impacts to the United States.   
Preliminary Findings 
In order to study the spatial relationships of refineries within the United States, 
ESRI ArcMap 9.3.1 was utilized to complete an initial analysis.  Data were collected 
from public sources such as the U.S. Department of Energy (DoE), Energy Information 
Administration (DoE), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and 
the United States Census Bureau.  The data pieces include the following refining capacity 
and location by refinery, hurricane paths (both lines and points), and baseline state and 
world boundaries.   
The initial analysis consisted of creating a 50-mile buffer zone around each 
refinery and overlaying hurricane tracks for both Category 4 and 5 with the intent of 
visually inspecting the relationship between storms and clusters of refineries.  Figure 2-2 
below shows the number of Category 4 and 5 storms historically that have made landfall 
within a 50-mile radius of a refinery.   
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Figure 2-2:  50-mile Refinery Buffer and Category 4 and 5 Hurricane Tracks 
The results of the initial analysis confirm that there is a spatial relationship in the 
infrastructure with respect to natural disasters.  For example, refinery 1 shown above has 
not been impacted by a hurricane of a Category 4 or 5 strength.  Refinery 2 on the other 
hand, has experienced three Category 5 hurricanes and two Category 4 hurricanes.  This 
shows that the location of a refinery can increase the risk to the refinery.   Also of note, 
refineries with the highest production capacity were often located in clusters of two to 
three within a mile of each other.  Further analysis will be completed in Phase II to 
determine how the spatial relationship and coupling effects can be incorporated into the 
overall risk equation.   
Conclusion 
The relationships between critical infrastructures are complicated and 
interdependencies that exist between infrastructures are not well-defined.  Incorporating 
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spatial relationships and coupling effects into the risk equation proposes a better way to 
predict the effect of interdependencies which have been shown to cause cascading 
failures during disaster events.  Understanding and analyzing risk provides the decision 
and policy-making process better information in order to protect critical infrastructure 
across the United States.   
This paper presents a new risk equation and a methodology to analyze and 
validate risk based on the modified risk equation.  While spatial relationships and 
coupling have been identified as key factors to quantifying infrastructure risk, it appears 
that this is an area of study that requires further investigation.  This research intends to 
further define the interdependencies of the infrastructure system in order to better 
quantify the overall risk to both the infrastructure system and individual parts of the 
system.     
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III. Scholarly Article  
Submitted to the 2012 Western Decision Sciences Institute 
Spatial Risk Analysis of Oil Refineries and Impacts to Military Operations 
Zachary L. Schiff and William E. Sitzabee, Ph.D., P.E. 
Abstract 
Failures of critical infrastructure have become more commonplace due to 
advances in technology, terrorist threat, and coupling of infrastructures.  Military 
operations are dependent on refined petroleum products to provide the ability to project 
forces worldwide.  Oil refineries are critical to military readiness and tend to be co-
located in relatively small geographic regions.  This paper presents a methodology to 
statistically measure the increase in vulnerability due to clustering of the high-volume oil 
refineries.   
Paper type: Full paper 
Introduction 
Over the past quarter century, technology advances have contributed to an 
increase connectedness, also known as coupling effects or interdependencies, between 
different critical infrastructure systems.  Four general categories of coupling effects exist: 
physical, cyber, geographic, and logical [1].  As a result, natural disasters, aging 
infrastructure, human error, and terrorist attacks have the ability to cause disruptions to 
society in multiple different economic sectors and infrastructure systems at the same 
time.  With multiple disruptions to critical infrastructure, the nation’s ability to function 
properly is severely hampered and impacts the economy, government, and health sectors.  
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Limits of money, time, and manpower require a management strategy to determine where 
resources should be applied to reduce the impacts of failure to critical infrastructure.  
This is typically completed in a two-step process: risk assessment and risk management 
[2].  Risk assessment involves the collection and integration of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence.  Risk management determines which measures should be taken based on a 
risk reductions strategy [2].   
Background 
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Homeland Security 
Department (HSD) in order to protect key resources and infrastructure from disaster, 
ultimately to reduce the impact of terrorist attacks on the United States.  Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive Number 7 (HSPD-7) stated the Secretary of Homeland 
security was responsible for coordinating the overall national effort to identify, prioritize, 
and protect critical infrastructure and resources.  HSPD-7 also designated agencies 
responsible for conducting analyses and directed HSD to produce a comprehensive, 
integrated plan for critical infrastructure.   The National Strategy for Homeland Security 
categorized critical infrastructure into 13 different sectors and the petroleum 
infrastructure falls within the energy sector [3].   The petroleum infrastructure and 
refineries are actively monitored by the Department of Homeland Security and 
Department of Energy.  The relationship between government entities and private 
industry is complicated due to the fact that approximately 85 percent of the national 
infrastructure is owned by private industry [4].  Furthermore, the government acts as both 
a regulator and consumer [5].   
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Energy security is a key concern for military leaders within the Department of 
Defense (DoD) as privately and publicly operated commercial distributions systems 
provide energy in different forms to the bases.  While short-term outages are routinely 
exercised, the impacts of long-term outages are not well understood [6].  Within the 
United States Air Force, infrastructure energy only accounts for a small portion of the 
overall energy consumption.  Nearly 84 percent of the energy consumed by the Air Force 
is aviation fuel use, with 12 percent in facilities and 4 percent in vehicle and ground 
equipment.  This indicates that a major disruption in fuel supply would have major 
mission impacts and could significantly disrupt operations and our national security.    
 The United States refining industry supplies over 50 percent of the jet fuel 
demand and the DoD has consumed as much as 145 million barrels annually [7].  Typical 
refineries yield a limited supply of jet fuel and diesel fuel depending on the type and 
quality of crude oil processed.  Petroleum infrastructure has been identified as 
geographically concentrated in the past and different types of policy methods were 
evaluated to encourage dispersion [8].  Specifically, Texas and Louisiana refineries 
account for 43 percent of the total United States refining capacity.   Of further concern, 
according to GAO-09-87, refineries are producing at a level very close to maximum 
capacity [9].  As a result, a disaster, either natural or man-made, could potentially result 
in large shortages for a time period. 
Risk Analysis 
The concept of risk and risk assessments have a long history, and date back more 
than 2,400 years ago when the Athenians utilized their risk assessment methods before 
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making decisions in war [10].  Understanding and measuring risk against consequences 
has been one of the foundational pillars of western society.   Risk analysis is commonly 
used to describe the uncertainty involved with events that affect the financial market, 
health industry, and critical infrastructure.  In both business and government, leaders are 
faced with decisions and information that has uncertainty.  Understanding the uncertainty 
provides the baseline for making better decisions [11].     
Risk, a function of vulnerability, consequence, and threat, is typically used for 
computing risk and also discussions about risk. Lowrance [12] introduced risk as a 
measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects. Cox [13] provides generally-
accepted definitions for each of these terms. Risk is defined as the potential for loss or 
harm due to the likelihood of an unwanted event and the consequences of the event. 
Consequence is the outcome of the event that includes any losses of capability or ability 
to operate normally. Threat is any indication, circumstance, or location that places an 
asset or event with the potential to cause damage. Vulnerability is any weakness in the 
asset or system infrastructure design that can be exploited [13]. 
In the United States Governments’ Risk Assessment Methods, there have been 
three phases of formulas in the past decade [14]. In the first phase that spanned FY2001 
to FY2003, the Department of Justice was responsible for handling risk and risk equated 
to population. In the second phase which spanned FY2004 to FY2005, risk was the sum 
of threat (T), critical infrastructure (CI), and population density. In the third phase, which 
is currently still in practice, the probability of events was systematically introduced into 
the formula. Equation 1 shows the current approach in which risk is a function of threat 
(T), vulnerability (V), and consequence (C) variables [2]. 
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Risk = f (T, V, C)                  (1) 
In the review of this method by the national research council, multiplying the variables 
together produces acceptable natural disaster risk quantification [15]. 
Geographic Information Systems 
Tobler [16] introduced the first law of geography which states that everything is 
related, but items that have smaller distances between them are more related than distant 
items.  Spatial autocorrelation is the tool that was created as a result of this relationship 
and describes the relatedness of items and their relationships across space [17].  Several 
authors [18, 19] have used spatial tools to determine the relationship of infrastructure 
systems and evaluate the vulnerability of infrastructure systems.  Geographic Information 
Systems provide a toolset to both statistically and visually identify trends in data with 
respect to both space and attributes.   
Research 
This research examines how the spatial relationship and coupling effect of oil 
refineries pose a threat to military readiness.  A spatial analysis of oil refining data was 
conducted to determine how oil refineries are related to each other based on location and 
capacity.  This will yield insight as to the type of threats and potential risk mitigation 
strategies that are available to minimize future disruptions.   
Data Collection 
Data were collected from public sources including the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DoE), Energy Information Administration (DoE), and the United States Census Bureau. 
The data pieces include refining capacity, refinery names, and United States boundaries. 
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The refining capacity, name, and production characteristics are available from the Energy 
Information Administration. Refinery names were georeferenced with latitude and 
longitude coordinates in order to spatially connect the production characteristics with 
location. 
Spatial Analysis 
In order to determine if a correlation exists between location and capacity of the 
oil refineries, two statistical tools are available:  Spatial Autocorrelation (Global Moran’s 
I) and Cluster/Outlier Analysis (Local Anselin’s I).  Given a set of features and an 
associated attribute, these tools evaluate whether pattern exists that is clustered, 
dispersed, or random.   Each of the tools returns four different values: Local/Global I 
value, z-score, p-value, and a code representing the cluster type.  A large I-value 
(positive/negative) indicates a strong relation of the feature with a nearby feature.  An I-
value of zero indicates that there is not a relationship between location and the attribute.  
The p-value and z-score confirm statistically whether a correlation exists.  Table 3-1 
shows the results of the Moran’s I analysis and Figure 3-1 shows the spatial analysis with 
high output refineries in a clustered region highlighted.  The Moran’s I analysis reveals 
that there is less than a 1% chance that the pattern is random and confirms a clustered 
pattern.   
Table 3-1:  Moran’s I Analysis 
 Moran’s I z-score  p-value 
Oil Refinery Analysis 0.1582 11.1848 0.0000 
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Figure 3-1:  Oil Refinery Spatial Analysis 
Discussion 
The spatial analysis compared oil refinery location and capacity which led to three 
key findings.  First, the analysis showed that the Southeast Gulf Region has an area with 
high output, highly clustered refineries.  Second, the analysis revealed that the Great 
Lakes Region also has a high output, clustered area with several refineries; this was an 
unexpected result.  Finally, the West Coast Region had a high output cluster of refineries 
that was less significant than the first two regions, and was also unexpected.   
This research effort shows visually and mathematically that high capacity 
refineries are co-located in a very small geographic area.  While this was previously 
identified visually, this paper presents a method to use spatial statistics to quantify and 
validate previous research.  Since vulnerability is directly tied to risk, several conclusions 
can be drawn. Oil refineries within the areas identified above should be protected against 
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natural disasters (i.e. hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis).   Furthermore, these are the 
refineries that should be considered for hardening in a man-made disaster scenario (i.e. 
terrorism).     
As a result of the refineries operating at near full capacity, policy to encourage the 
construction of new refineries and more capacity should be proposed to reduce the 
vulnerability of a disruption to military readiness.  Oil refined products play a key role in 
the military’s ability to conduct operations across the world.  A significant disruption to 
the oil refinery system could potentially have severe policy and military implications.    
Finally, the tools in this research can be used to determine where to place future 
capacity and how to reduce the system impacts of location within the oil refinery system.  
Policy makers should shape and mold policy to protect existing refineries and look for 
ways to encourage dispersal in the construction of future refineries.  The tools used in this 
research could visually and mathematically determine whether the new refinery reduces 
the vulnerability and thus the overall risk to the system.   
Disclaimer 
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect 
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the 
United States Government.   
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Abstract 
In the last decade, the United States has experienced first-hand the devastating 
impacts of disasters, both natural and man-made, to critical infrastructure.  As a result of 
the critical infrastructure failures, Congress has placed additional emphasis on risk 
quantification and risk mitigation strategies.  The current DHS equation incorporates 
aspects of individual component risk, but fails to take into account system 
interdependencies and location effects.  This paper presents a modified risk equation and 
methodology that incorporates coupling effects and spatial relationships to account for 
interdependencies and location of oil refinery systems.  Applying critical infrastructure 
analysis and geographical information systems and sciences tools, this approach yields a 
risk analysis strategy that takes into account the overall risk of both the individual 
refinery and system effects of the refinery.  
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Introduction 
The United States recently experienced the impacts of disasters, both natural and 
man-made, to critical infrastructure.  Events such as Hurricanes Katrina, Ike, and Rita; 
September 11, 2001 attacks, Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, and the Northeast Power 
Blackout of 2003 are a few of the events within the last decade that cost taxpayers, 
businesses, and the government billions of dollars and severely impacted the operation of 
several key critical infrastructure systems for an extended period of time [1].  Following 
the September, 11 2001 attacks, officials identified the lack of a critical infrastructure risk 
mitigation strategy as an area for improvement [1].  Risk analysis plays a key role in 
determining the best allocation of limited resources to the most critical and vulnerable 
components of the infrastructure.  Key policy and fiscal decisions require a risk 
management strategy to protect and mitigate impacts of disasters on critical 
infrastructure.  This paper establishes a process and develops techniques to quantify both 
risk to the infrastructure system and the individual parts of the system.  Furthermore, this 
paper presents an updated risk equation that expands the current methodology used by the 
Department of Homeland Security to include interdependencies between critical 
infrastructure sectors and system location effects to account for system dynamics and 
relationships; an area that was previously unaccounted for in the past.  A modified risk 
equations proposes the addition of two additional variables:  Spatial Relationship and 
Coupling Effect.  Oil refineries are used as a case study to show the application of the 
modified risk equation. 
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Background 
Critical Infrastructure  
 Critical infrastructure, defined by the United States of America Patriot Act of 
2001 (P.L. 107-56 Section 1016e), is the set of physical or virtual assets that are vital to 
the United States’ ability to function.  Failure of these systems has effects on the security, 
economy, public health, and safety of citizens within the United States [2].  In 2002, the 
Homeland Security act established the Department of Homeland Security to “prevent 
terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to 
terrorism, and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that 
occur within the United States” [3].  Responsibilities were further defined in Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), where the Secretary of Homeland Security 
was identified as responsible for coordinating the overall effort to identify, prioritize, and 
protect critical infrastructure [4].   
 Petroleum infrastructure falls under the energy sector within the National Strategy 
for Homeland Security [1].  The Department of Homeland Security and Department of 
Energy are responsible for monitoring and protecting petroleum infrastructure and 
refineries.  Private industry owns approximately 85 percent of the national infrastructure.  
However, government, public, and private entities require reliable operation of these 
systems to provide for the well-being of citizens, national defense, and vital functions [5].  
Government plays a complicated and often conflicted role as both a customer and 
regulator.  Simonoff, et al. [6] discussed the three major components of the energy sector: 
electrical power, oil, and gas infrastructure.  He explicates the energy infrastructure 
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sector’s connection to nearly every other sector and failure often causes multiple failures 
within other sectors.   
 Oil infrastructure consists of five components:  oil production, crude oil transport, 
refining, product transport and distribution, and control and other support systems.  The 
petroleum industry was split into five Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts 
(PADDs) based on geographic location during WWII [7].  Parformak [8] described 
geographic concentration of critical infrastructure across numerous sectors and policy 
methods for encouraging dispersion.  Specifically, Texas and Louisiana account for over 
43 percent of the total refining capacity in the United States [8].  During Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita, refinery production capability was reduced 13 percent and 14 percent, 
respectively [9].  Due to the reduced capacity, hurricanes were shown to cause gas price 
increases from $1.10 to $2.55 after the disasters [9].  In addition, increased petroleum 
demand in the past twenty years has increased at a faster rate than refining production 
capability to provide gas, diesel, and other petroleum products.  Currently, refineries are 
producing at a level very near their maximum capacity across the United States [10]. 
 With the advances and automation of infrastructure systems due to technology, 
critical infrastructure continues to become increasingly dependent on other infrastructure 
systems.  As a result of interdependencies, in 1996, the Presidential Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection was established [5].  After a 15-month study, the 
commission concluded that: 
1) Infrastructure is at serious risk 
2) No warning system is in place 
3) Government and industry does not efficiently share information 
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4) Federal R&D budgets do not include study of component infrastructure system 
threat 
Interdependency is defined as a linkage or connection between two infrastructure 
systems, through which the state of one infrastructure influences another [11].  Four 
general categories were developed to describe interdependency relationships between 
infrastructures:   
1) Physical – reliance on material flow from one infrastructure to another  
2) Cyber – reliance on information transfer between infrastructures 
3) Geographic – local events affect multiple infrastructures due to proximity 
4) Logical – a dependency that is neither of the above categories, but is instead 
inferred and characterized mostly by human decisions and actions 
Risk Analysis and Assessment 
In order to better define risk methodology and objectives, Kaplan and Garrick 
[12] and Haimes [13] introduce six questions to form the foundation of risk analysis and 
risk management: 
1.  What can go wrong? 
2.  What is the likelihood? 
3.  What are the consequences? 
4.  What can be done and what options are available? 
5.  What is the trade-off between cost, benefit, and risk? 
6.  What are the impacts of current decisions on future options? 
These questions form the basis of the risk management framework within the United 
States and were critical in the phased development of the risk equations used by the 
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Department of Homeland Security.  The National Infrastructure Protection Plan [14] 
constructed a risk framework that is based on combination of the basic risk assessment 
and management process.  This framework established the process for combining 
consequence, vulnerability, and threat information to produce assessments of national or 
sector risk.  The risk management framework is a continuous feedback loop to enhance 
infrastructure protection by focusing efforts into six steps: 
1.  Set Goals and Objectives 
2.  Identify Systems and Networks 
3.  Assess Risks 
4.  Prioritize  
5.  Implement Programs 
6.  Measure Effectiveness 
The framework identified above is the baseline across the risk analysis profession and is 
utilized in the majority of risk assessment methodologies.  Toffler [15] discussed the 
importance and impact on decision-making at all levels, and the complexity of the risk 
assessment management process calls for continuous learning. 
Since 2001, three phases of risk assessment formulas have been used by the 
Department of Homeland Security in the past decade [16].   The third phase, which is 
currently in practice, approaches risk as a function of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence as shown by Equation 1 below: 
Risk = f ( T, V, C )              (1) 
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Cox [17] provides the generally-accepted definitions for each of the terms.  Risk is 
defined as “the potential for loss or harm due to the likelihood of an unwanted event and 
the consequences of the event.”  Consequence is “the outcome of the event that includes 
any losses of capability or ability to operate normally.”  Threat is “any indication, 
circumstance, or location that places an asset or event with the potential to cause 
damage.”  Vulnerability is “any weakness in the asset or system infrastructure design that 
can be exploited.”   
Methodology 
One of the pitfalls of the current Department of Homeland Security Risk Equation 
is that the equation fails to capture aggregate impacts to the system from individually 
identified risks.  For example, an oil refinery that is co-located with several other 
refineries may have the same threat, vulnerability, and consequence of a similar refinery 
located by itself a large distance away.  This would yield a similar relative risk value that 
prioritizes both of the refineries in the same manner.  However, an event, such as a 
hurricane or earthquake, at the grouped refineries would result in a greater reduction of 
output from the overall system compared to a similar event at an isolated refinery.  
Therefore, the refinery among the group should have a greater nominal risk score than the 
isolated refinery.  As a result, a modified risk equation, Equation 2, is proposed 
consisting of five inputs:  threat (T), vulnerability (V), consequence (C), spatial 
relationship (SR), and coupling effects (CE).   
Risk = f ( T, V, C, SR, CE )              (2) 
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The SR variable is a measure of how components of an infrastructure system are 
spatially related to the overall system.  Infrastructure systems are not randomly 
constructed, but are instead typically built from the expansion of existing infrastructure.  
This system behavior (i.e. infrastructure construction) leads to built infrastructure that 
follows a unique pattern which can add risk to the overall system.  For example, gulf 
coast refineries depend greatly on shipping of raw crude, and therefore, have developed 
concentrations near deepwater ports such as the port near Galveston, Texas.  Such 
concentrations create a problem with many statistical tools that assume random 
dispersion.  Inferential statistics rely on the assumption of randomness and normality in 
order for most toolsets to be used.  Spatial autocorrelation does not require randomness in 
the data and provides a statistical tool that measures correlation based on feature 
locations and attributes.     
The CE variable is a measure of the interdependency relationship of the 
infrastructure system to other infrastructure systems.  Cascading failures within 
infrastructure systems have been well-documented within the past few decades.  
Capturing the relationships between the infrastructures requires an ability to 
mathematically describe how the system operates.  Since infrastructure systems are easily 
modeled as networks, in the sense that each element is connected to several other 
elements, network analysis is appropriate to mathematically calculate how infrastructure 
systems are related.  This allows for risk values to be compared across several 
infrastructure systems and decision-makers to optimize resources in a risk management 
strategy across many systems.   The following sections outline the procedures for 
developing the SR and CE variables through a gulf coast hurricane scenario.  The 
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scenario determines the most at-risk oil refineries using both the traditional and modified 
methods.   
Data 
Data were compiled from public government records and public sources.  The 
annual hurricane probability map based on data from 1944-1999 was used to determine 
threat for each refinery based on information available from the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration [18].  Oil production capacity was obtained from the United 
States Energy Information Administration and was geo-referenced with latitude and 
longitude coordinates to connect production characteristics and location [19].   The 
hurricane probability data were used for threat; the specific vulnerability data were 
considered but held fixed from both analyses due to security classification restrictions; 
and the capacity data were used for consequence.   
Spatial Relationship Analysis 
In order to manage the amount of complex data and information available, 
geographic information systems are designed to make it easy to organize, store, access, 
manipulate, and synthesize information into solutions for a variety of problems [20].  
Geographic information systems originated over 40 years ago and tie together datasets 
with spatial data.  As a result, many tools have been developed to describe the 
interrelatedness of relationships across geographic systems.   
The spatial autocorrelation (Global Moran’s I) tool measures spatial correlation 
based on feature locations and feature attributes simultaneously [21]. The output of the 
tool is an evaluation of whether patterns are clustered, dispersed, or random.  The sign on 
the Moran’s index value provides an indicator as to whether the pattern is clustered or 
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dispersed.  A negative value for the Moran’s index indicate that the pattern is dispersed, 
while a positive value for the Moran’s index indicate the pattern is clustered.  A value of 
zero indicates a completely random pattern.  Figure 1 below visually depicts a clustered 
and dispersed pattern. 
   
    
 
    
 
                  (Negative; Dispersed)       (Positive; Clustered) 
Figure 1: Moran’s I Example (Adapted from [20; pg 103]) 
The spatial autocorrelation tool requires that an interpretation is made within the context 
of standard hypothesis testing [21]. The Moran’s I value provides a global perspective as 
to whether a pattern exists, in this case, across an infrastructure system.   
Cluster and Outlier Analysis (Anselin’s Local I) provides the toolset to identify 
spatial clusters with features that are similar in magnitude and location. The Local 
Indicator of Spatial Association (LISA) provides indications as to whether there is 
statistically significant clustering of observations with a certain attribute value [22].  This 
provides the means to determine hot spots and local significance maps with respect to the 
global region [23].  The Local I value for each refinery was utilized to determine the 
spatial relationship of that refinery to other nearby refineries. 
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Coupling Effect Analysis 
Interdependencies between infrastructures can be characterized by material, data, 
or energy flow between different infrastructure systems.  Network analysis provides a 
quantitative mathematical method to represent the critical infrastructure systems and 
determine the number of connections or links that connect the infrastructures.  In this 
paper, directed networks, specifically the metrics of cocitation and bibliographic 
coupling, were utilized to calculate the number of common neighbors within a network 
[24].   
Figure 4-2 shows a 13x13 Matrix (A) was set up to represent each of the different 
critical infrastructure systems as specified within the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan [14].  A value of 1 represents a directed connection from one infrastructure to 
another infrastructure.  A directed connection is used because infrastructures, although 
connected, may or may not reciprocate in its inputs and outputs.  For example 
infrastructure A provides its output as an input to infrastructure B and so this connection 
is assigned a value of 1.  Infrastructure B may or may not provide an output to 
infrastructure A.  A value of 0 is assigned if there is no connection in this direction.   
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Banking 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Government 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Transportation 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Defense Industrial Base 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Communications 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Postal and Shipping 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Chemical Industry 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Energy 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Food 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Emergency Services 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Agriculture 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Public Health 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Water 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Figure 4-2:  Critical Infrastructure Sectors Interdependency Matrix 
 
Based on this Matrix (A), Cocitation (C), Equation 3, was used to calculate the 
number of common neighbors within the network and is shown below in Figure 3.   
C = AAT      (3) 
Due to the relationships within matrix A, cocitation and bibliographic coupling methods 
yield the same result and can be used to ensure that the connections between the 
infrastructures were represented correctly.  The resulting matrix provides the number of 
common neighbors sorted by infrastructure.   
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Banking 7 5 6 2 6 3 5 5 1 2 2 1 4 
Government 5 10 6 2 7 3 6 7 1 3 2 0 4 
Transportation 6 6 9 1 9 2 6 6 1 1 2 1 3 
Defense Industrial Base 2 2 1 3 2 1 1 3 1 3 0 1 3 
Communications 6 7 9 2 10 2 7 7 1 2 2 1 4 
Postal and Shipping 3 3 2 1 2 3 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 
Chemical Industry 5 6 6 1 7 2 7 4 0 1 2 0 3 
Energy 5 7 6 3 7 2 4 10 2 4 0 1 5 
Food 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 1 2 
Emergency Services 2 3 1 3 2 1 1 4 2 4 0 1 4 
Agriculture 2 2 2 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 
Public Health 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Water 4 4 3 3 4 2 3 5 2 4 1 1 6 
Figure 3:  Critical Infrastructure Cocitation Matrix 
The CE metric was established by using the ratio of the total number of common 
neighbors and total possible number of common neighbors.  This ratio characterizes how 
interdependent each individual critical infrastructure system is and their relation to other 
critical infrastructures and is shown below in Equation 4.    
CE = # of Common Neighbors / Total # of Possible Neighbors  (4) 
 
Risk Equation Calculations and Paired Statistical Analysis 
  In the case of natural disasters, this paper shows both equations using equally 
weighted variables to produce a risk value.   In the review of this method by the national 
research council, multiplying the variables together produces acceptable and state-of-the-
art natural disaster risk quantification [25].  Following calculation of the risk scores, a 
risk map was generated using the Inverse Distance Weighting (IDW) method to visually 
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show high-risk areas to refineries.  A comparison of the DHS risk equation and the 
modified risk equation proposed in this paper was completed to establish whether there is 
a statistical difference between the risk values.  The dataset of risk values were 
determined to be non-normal, and as a result, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test is 
appropriate to assess whether the population mean ranks differ.  
 
Results 
Spatial Relationship Results 
 The spatial relationship analysis compared the refinery location and output, both 
globally and locally, to determine if there is a relationship.  The Global Moran’s I 
analysis revealed that there is less than a 1 percent chance that the pattern is random and 
confirms a clustered pattern based on the z-score and p-value.  This is based on a 
Moran’s I score of 0.1582, z-score of 11.1848, and p-value of 0.0000.  The Local 
Anselin’s I spatial analysis showed that 24 of the 146 refineries are highly concentrated, 
high output refineries.    
Coupling Effect Results 
 The coupling effect analysis compared the number of interdependencies between 
set of different critical infrastructure systems.  Table 4-1 shows the results of the coupling 
effect variable for each of the critical infrastructure sectors.  
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Table 4-1:  Coupling Effect Value for each Critical Infrastructure Sector 
Infrastructure 
Sector 
Coupling Effect Infrastructure Sector Coupling Effect 
Communications 1.00 Emergency Services 0.48 
Energy 0.91 Defense Industrial Base 0.40 
Government 0.91 Postal and Shipping 0.38 
Transportation 0.87 Agriculture 0.24 
Banking 0.83 Food 0.24 
Chemical Industry 0.73 Public Health 0.16 
Water 0.71   
 
Risk Equation Results  
 Risk values for each of the 146 refineries were calculated using the traditional risk 
equation and the modified risk equation in a Gulf Coast Hurricane Scenario.  The 
traditional risk equation and modified risk equation results for the top ten highest risk 
refineries are shown below in Table 4-2.  The risk equations not only presented different 
results in the rank for the highest risk refineries, but it should be highlighted that the 
modified risk provides a higher relative difference between the risk values.  The relative 
difference in the modified equation provides for clearer definition of where limited 
resources should be prioritized to eliminate the most risk across the oil refinery system.   
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Table 4-2:  Top 10 High-Risk Oil Refineries in Gulf Coast Hurricane Scenario 
Refinery Name Location Company T V C SR CE DHS Risk 
Mod 
Risk 
Baytown TX ExxonMobile 0.37 1 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.37 0.31 
Texas City TX BP 0.40 1 0.83 0.78 0.91 0.33 0.24 
Baton Rouge LA ExxonMobile 0.40 1 0.90 0.59 0.91 0.36 0.19 
Lake Charles LA Citgo 0.35 1 0.76 0.63 0.91 0.27 0.15 
Garyville LA Marathon Petroleum 0.37 1 0.78 0.54 0.91 0.28 0.14 
Beaumont TX ExxonMobile 0.35 1 0.63 0.62 0.91 0.22 0.13 
Port Arthur TX Valero 0.41 1 0.58 0.58 0.91 0.24 0.12 
Deer Park TX Shell Oil 0.31 1 0.60 0.55 0.91 -- 0.09 
Port Arthur TX Motiva Enterprises 0.41 1 0.51 0.49 0.91 0.21 0.09 
St. Charles LA Valero 0.42 1 0.47 0.33 0.91 0.20 0.06 
Pascagoula MS Chevron 0.42 1 0.47 -- -- 0.21 -- 
 
A paired comparison was completed to determine whether the means of the risk 
equations were statistically different.  Both data sets were non-normal and for this reason, 
the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test is appropriate.  The Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test Statistic 
Probability <S was less than 0.0001.  This indicates that the two populations are 
statistically different.  
Additionally, two risk maps were created using the IDW method to show the 
differences between the traditional and modified risk equation with the results normalized 
for scale.  The traditional DHS and modified risk maps, shown below in Figures 4-4 and 
4-5 respectively, display the results of a gulf coast hurricane threat on oil refineries.  As 
expected, the modified risk equation provided more fidelity and a smaller area of high-
risk than the traditional method.   
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Figure 4-4:  Traditional DHS Risk Equation 
Figure 4-5:  Modified Risk Equation 
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Conclusions 
Key findings 
There are several key findings as a result of the spatial analysis, interdependency 
analysis, and risk equation comparisons.  These results led to the development of a 
modified risk equation and a new method for determining the relationship of the 
infrastructure components to the specific critical infrastructure system and overall critical 
infrastructure system 
The spatial analysis showed that refineries are geographically concentrated and 
three areas specifically contain high-output, clustered refineries:  Southeast Gulf Region, 
Great Lakes Region, and West Coast Region.  While the Southeast Gulf Region is very 
easily identified and apparent; the Great Lakes and West Coast Regions were unexpected 
results.  This analysis provided a mathematical method for determining if critical 
components of infrastructure are co-located in a small area.   
The coupling effect analysis provided a method for calculating how connected 
critical infrastructure systems are to each other.  The coupling effect analysis added no 
variance since the refineries were part of the same infrastructure system.  If components 
from multiple, different infrastructure systems were included in this study, variance 
would have been added with higher CE scores assigned to more interconnected 
infrastructures.  For the analysis conducted, and as expected, communications, energy, 
and government had high CE scores and are therefore more connected and more critical 
than other infrastructure sectors.  A disruption in operation in any of these systems would 
cause many other critical infrastructure systems to also experience disruptions.  The 
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intended purpose of the coupling effect analysis is to provide a method for decision-
makers to compare projects across multiple, different infrastructures in order to apply 
limited resources to the most critical and high-risk components of an infrastructure.   
  Finally, as expected, the comparison between the traditional and modified risk 
analysis showed that the two equations provide 1) different rankings for the top ten list of 
high-risk oil refineries and 2) statistically different values.  This is an important detail as 
any other result would indicate that the additional analysis does not yield additional 
information about the oil refinery infrastructure risk and does not change the overall risk 
values.  The modified analysis provides additional fidelity to where it is most appropriate 
so as to better apply limited resources.  This is also confirmed in the visual comparison of 
the risk maps, where the modified equation yields a more distinct, smaller geographic 
region of high risk refineries.  Furthermore, the classification of high risk refineries can 
be reduced and this further provides additional fidelity.  Finally, the modified risk 
equation could be used to provide guidance as to where to encourage construction of 
additional facilities and add capacity to existing refineries to reduce the overall risk to the 
system.   
 
Future Research 
 Future research should look into further developing the relationships and 
correlation between the risk variables.  Next, proximity effects due to location should 
also be further investigated when looking at several different infrastructure systems and 
methods need to be expanded to capture proximity effects when a disaster occurs.  Next, 
research should expand the modified risk analysis to include other threat scenarios and 
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infrastructure systems.  As the analysis for the different infrastructures are compiled, 
decision-quality information can be derived from the different analysis to determine 
where to apply limited resources in the short-term.  Furthermore, the output from natural 
disaster risk should be expanded and more threat analysis is needed to determine the 
impact of other man-made events, such as terrorism.  Finally, as data availability on 
infrastructure outputs and interactions as well as computing power increases, 
infrastructure modeling and real-time monitoring of the infrastructures can be 
accomplished to determine high-risk areas within the infrastructure systems.   
 
Discussion 
 With the vast amount of infrastructure and increased interconnectedness due to 
technology, geographic information systems provide a tool that allows incorporation of 
multiple datasets across several infrastructures to be linked with location data.  
Geographic information systems are built with the intent to handle intensive datasets and 
their tools are useful to determine mathematically what role location plays in a system.   
This paper proposed a method to introduce spatial relationships into the risk equation to 
determine where future expansion of the system should be encouraged to reduce the 
overall system risk. 
 Network analysis provides a robust mathematical method to quantify the 
relationships and connections between infrastructures.  This paper presented the 
methodology to prioritize the critical infrastructure sectors based on the level of coupling 
with other infrastructure sectors.  This is easily expanded to the sub-system level with 
additional data and could be used to prioritize limited resources to the most critical pieces 
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of infrastructure.  Many different research efforts have been established to show and 
account for coupling effects and interdependencies; this paper proposed a method to 
introduce them into the risk equation to prioritize which infrastructure systems should 
receive limited resources. 
 The modified equation presented in this paper provides a method to incorporate 
system effects, specifically location and interdependencies, into the current risk equation.  
The benefits of the modified equation are that it provides an easy to execute method of 
analysis; it incorporates system effects into the traditional equation; it provides more 
fidelity; and it requires minimal additional data.  This allows decision-makers to allocate 
limited resources in an effective manner to harden the most high-risk, critical 
infrastructure.     
 
Disclaimer 
The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect 
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the 
United States Government. 
References 
[1] Bush, George W.  The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructure.  Washington, DC: White House, 2003. 
[2] Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (October 26, 
2001) 
[3] Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 117 Stat. 745 (November 25, 2002) 
48 
[4] Bush, George W.  Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7): Critical 
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection.  Washington, DC: White 
House, 2003. 
[5] Robinson, C. Paul, Woodard, Joan B., and Varnado, Samuel G. Critical Infrastructure: 
Interlinked and Vulnerable.  Issues in Science and Technologies.  Fall, 1998; 15(1): 61-
67 
[6] Simonoff, Jeffrey, Restrepo, Carlos, Zimmerman, Rae, and Naphtali, Zvia.  Analysis 
of Electrical Power and Oil and Gas Pipeline Failures.  International Federation for 
Information Processing.  2007; 253: 381-394 
[7] Trench, Cheryl.  How Pipelines Make the Oil Market Work – Their Networks, 
Operation, and Regulation.  Memorandum for the Association of Oil Pipelines and 
American Petroleum Institute’s Pipeline Committee.  December, 2001.   
[8] Parformak, Paul.  Vulnerability of Concentrated Critical Infrastructure: Background 
and Policy Options.  Congressional Report for Congress, 2007.   
[9] Seesel, John.  Investigation of Gasoline Manipulation and Post-Katrina Gasoline Price 
Increases.  Federal Trade Commission, Spring, 2006. 
[10] Rusco, Frank.  Refinery Outages can impact Petroleum Product Price, but no Federal 
Requirements to Report Outages Exist.  United States Government Accountability Office.  
2008, Oct:  GAO-09-87. 
[11] Rinaldi, Stephen, Peerenboom, James, Kelly, Terrence.  Identifying, Understanding, 
and Analyzing Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies.  IEEE Control System 
Magazine.  December, 2001: 12-25.   
[12] Kaplan, Stanley and Garrick, John B.  On the Quantitative Definition of Risk.  Risk 
Analysis.  1981 Mar; 1(1): 11-27. 
[13] Haimes, Yacov.  Total Risk Management.  Risk Analysis.  1991 Jun; 11(2): 169-
171. 
[14] Chertoff, Michael.  National Infrastructure Protection Plan.  Washington, D.C., 
Department of Homeland Security, 2009.   
[15] Toffler, Alvin.  The Third Wave: The Classic Study of Tomorrow.   New York, NY: 
Bantam, 1980.   
[16] Masse, Todd, O'Neil, Siobhan, and Rollins, John.  The Department of Homeland 
Security's Risk Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress.  
Congressional Report for Congress, 2007. 
49 
[17] Cox, Jr., Anthony.  Limitations of “Risk = Threat x Vulnerability x Consequence”.  
Risk Analysis. 2008 Dec; 28(6):1749-61 
[18] Kimberlain, Todd.  Atlantic Basin Tropical Cyclone Probabilities [Internet].  
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; 2010, January 5 [cited 25 January, 
2012].  Available from http://forecast.weather.gov/jetstream/tropics/tc_atlclimo_pct.htm. 
[19] Production Capacity of Operable Petroleum Refineries by State and Individual 
Refinery as of January 1, 2011 [Internet].  Energy Information Administration; 2011, 24 
June [cited 25 January, 2012].  Available from 
http://205.254.135.24/petroleum/refinerycapacity/. 
[20] Longley, Paul A., Goodchild, Michael F., Maguire, David J., Rhind, David W.  
Geographic Information Systems and Science.  3rd ed. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010.  560 p. 
[21] How Spatial Autocorrelation Works [Internet].  ESRI; 2010, 1 January [cited 21 
November 2011]. Available from 
http://help.arcgis.com/en/arcgisdesktop/10.0/help/index.html#/Spatial_ 
Autocorrelation_Global_Moran_s_I/005p000000n00000/ 
[22] Anselin, Luke.  Local Indicators of Spatial Association.  Geographic Analysis.  
1995: 27: 93-115 
[23] Feser, Edward J. and Bergman, Edward M.  National Industry Cluster Templates:  A 
Framework for Applied Regional Cluster Analysis.  Regional Studies.  2000: 34(1): 1-19.  
[24] Newman, M.E.J.  Networks, an Introduction.   Oxford, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 2010.  772 p. 
[25] Ahearne, John F.  Review of the Department of Homeland Security’s Approach to 
Risk Analysis.  Washington, D.C., National Research Council, 2010. 
 
50 
V.  Conclusions 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter presents the research significant findings relative to the development 
of a modified risk equation that incorporated two additional variables:  Spatial 
Relationship and Coupling Effect.  The scholarly articles presented in this thesis show the 
progression of the research and discuss the prominent results.  This chapter ties together 
the findings with respect to the research questions and further discusses the significance 
of the research as it applies to the risk management field and United States Air Force.  
Finally, recommendations for future research and a summary wrap up the closing of this 
thesis.   
Review of Findings 
 In this section, the significant findings in this research are related to the research 
questions in the introduction.  The research questions focused on the definition of the 
components of risk, critical node identification and vulnerability to an infrastructure 
system as a result of an event, infrastructure interdependencies and measurement of direct 
ties between infrastructure, and the impacts of infrastructure failure to the Air Force.  The 
next several paragraphs specifically address the findings with respect to the research 
questions.   
 The definition of the components of risk led to the development of two additional 
variables.  In the traditional Department of Homeland Security Risk Equation, risk is a 
function of threat, vulnerability and consequence.  This captures the individual risk of a 
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component of the infrastructure, but fails to capture system effects and risks.  This led to 
the development of two additional variables to account for system properties.  
 The first variable developed accounts for the spatial relationship of infrastructure 
which answers how much of an overall system is impacted by a disaster event.  Using 
geographic information systems and spatial analysis provided the means to evaluate how 
location impacts an infrastructure system.   Using oil refinery data, a method was 
developed to determine how spatially related an oil refinery is to other nearby refineries 
based on output.  This provided a way to determine which high-output facilities are 
clustered in a geographically small area.   
 The second variable calculated infrastructure coupling effects and answers how 
critical infrastructure is related to other infrastructure systems.  Linear networking 
provided the tool and method to mathematically calculate relationships between 
infrastructure systems.  In this research, the linear network method was applied to 
determine how the thirteen critical infrastructures, as defined by the National Strategy for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, are related.  The result of the linear network method is a 
prioritization list of critical infrastructure that defines which infrastructure system should 
receive limited resources in order to reduce risk of cascading failures from a national 
perspective. 
 The final question addressed the impacts of the oil refinery infrastructure failure 
to the military and United States Air Force.  The Department of Defense represents a 
large consumer of oil-refined products both locally and abroad.  While limited outages of 
oil refinery infrastructure are exercised regularly, the impacts of a long-term outage are 
not well-understood. This research identified three critical areas of oil refinery 
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infrastructure:  Southeast, Great Lakes, and West Coast Regions.  Disruption to multiple 
regions at the same time could potentially result in shortages for the Air Force due to 
United States oil refinery infrastructure operating at near-maximum capacity.  The 
methods proposed in this research for the modified risk equation support decision-making 
for future construction and expansion.  Additionally, critical areas were identified and 
high-risk, clustered refineries should be hardened against potential man-made and natural 
disaster events.   
Significance of Research 
 Critical infrastructure plays a key role in the United States’ security, economy, 
safety, and way of life.  Protecting critical infrastructure requires risk management 
strategies in order to use limited resources to reduce risk across a large and increasingly 
interconnected infrastructure.  Identification of high-risk infrastructures and infrastructure 
elements provides the foundation for developing a risk management strategy.  The 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Chertoff, 2009) states “national priorities must 
protect catastrophic loss of life and managing cascading, disruptive impacts on the United 
States and global economies across multiple threat scenarios.”  This research expanded 
on the Department of Homeland Security’s risk equation to account for system dynamics.  
In the past, the traditional risk equation only accounts for individual characteristics of the 
infrastructure system.  Adding system effects allows decision-makers to apply resources 
to the highest risk, coupled infrastructure whose failure would cause cascading failures 
across multiple infrastructures.   
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Future Research 
 There are several opportunities for future research that did not fall within the 
scope of this research effort.  First, development of the relationship between the risk 
variables is an area that requires more attention.  As it stands currently, risk is described 
as a function of the risk variables.  Identifying and developing the interaction between the 
variables is critical in the future development of risk analysis.  Second, proximity effects 
due to location within infrastructure should be further investigated when looking at 
multiple infrastructures to expand upon the effects of a disaster in a specific area.  This 
would allow for a better description of how a specific disaster will impact an area’s 
critical infrastructure network.  Next, the modified risk equation needs to be applied and 
expanded to include other threat scenarios and infrastructure systems.  As the analysis for 
other infrastructures are compiled, risk management strategies can be developed and 
compiled.  Furthermore, output from natural disaster risk analysis could be expanded to 
look at the impact of other man-made disaster events such as terrorism.  Critical portions 
of infrastructure that are high-risk and coupled within a natural disaster event may also be 
susceptible to man-made disaster events.  Finally, as data availability and technology 
advances, real-time infrastructure monitoring and modeling can be accomplished to 
identify events that cause widespread infrastructure failure within infrastructure systems.    
Summary 
This research established a risk analysis process as shown in the journal article in 
Chapter 4 and developed techniques that expanded risk to both the critical infrastructure 
system and critical components of the system.  A modified equation, presented on pages 
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11 and 33, was developed that incorporated two additional variables:  Spatial 
Relationship and Coupling Effect.  This allows decision-makers to more effectively 
allocate limited resources to the most critical infrastructure elements.   This thesis was 
presented in the scholarly article format.  The first article outlined the proposed modified 
equation and grounds for the additional variables.  The second article discussed the 
development of the spatial relationship variable and resulted in the identification of three 
high-output geographically concentrated oil refinery areas.  The third article incorporated 
the results from the spatial relationship article and developed the coupling effect 
coefficient to account for interdependencies in critical infrastructure.  This resulted in a 
comparison of the modified equation to the traditional equation which showed 
statistically different results and allowed more fidelity in the risk analysis process. 
Following the scholarly article format, Appendix A incorporates an expanded literature 
review, Appendix B discusses the expanded methodology, Appendix C provides the 
results of the research, and Appendix D is a summary of the sources of information. 
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Appendix A.  Literature Review 
The objective of the literature review was to build a knowledge base of critical 
infrastructure definitions, properties, and relationships in order to better understand the 
overall risks to the petroleum refining industry. The monetary costs of the September 11, 
2001 attacks (9/11), Hurricane Katrina, and Deep Horizon oil accident are estimated at 
$110 billion, $81 billion, and $40 billion, respectively (Berg, 2009; Knabb, Rhome, & 
Brown, 2005; Thompson, 2002).  Following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the lack of a 
critical infrastructure risk mitigation strategy was identified as an area for improvement 
(Bush, 2003). 
In both the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina, cascading failures occurred due to 
the interdependencies between infrastructures and spatial relationships of the 
infrastructure. Understanding, conceptualizing, and analyzing risk will provide the 
decision and policy-making process better information in order to protect critical 
infrastructure across the United States.  Additionally, Congress has a strong interest in the 
risk, interdependency, and vulnerability of critical infrastructure to natural hazards, 
accidents or terrorism (Parformak, 2007).    
Critical Infrastructure 
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56 Section 1016e) contains the federal 
government’s definition of critical infrastructure.  It stated that “critical infrastructure” is 
the set of 
“systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United 
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would 
56 
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or the combination of those matters 
(Section 1016e).” 
Additionally, Bush (2003) stated that “the continued reliability, robustness, and resiliency 
create a sense of confidence and form an important part of our national identity and 
strategic purpose.”   
 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security categorized critical infrastructure into 13 
different sectors and they are as follows:  Agriculture, Food, Water, Public Health, 
Emergency Services, Government, Defense Industrial Base, Information and 
Telecommunications, Energy, Transportation, Banking and Finance, Chemical Industry 
and Hazardous Materials, and Postal and Shipping (Bush, 2003).  Private industry owns 
approximately 85% of the national infrastructure; government, public, and private entities 
require reliable operations of these systems to provide for the well-being of citizens, 
national defense and vital functions (Robinson, Woodard, & Varnado, 1999).   
Government plays a dual role as both the regulator and the consumer.  Simonoff, et al. 
(2008) discussed three major components of the energy sector, electrical power, oil, and 
gas infrastructure.  The energy infrastructure sector is connected to virtually every other 
sector and failure often causes multiple failures within the other sectors.   
 
Oil Infrastructure consists of five components: oil production, crude oil transport, 
refining, product transport and distribution, and control and other support systems 
(Bullock, et al., 2006).   Refineries can be further categorized according to their setup:  
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topping refineries separate crude oil into constituent products by distillation; 
hydroskimming refineries utilize atmospheric distillation, naphtha reforming and can use 
sweet crude to produce gasoline; cracking refineries add vacuum distillation and catalytic 
cracking to produce light and middle distillates; and coking refineries are high conversion 
refineries that add coking/resid deconstruction to run medium/sour crude oil (Andrews, 
2009).  Figure A-1 shows the oil refining system and components with the boundaries set 
starting at flow into the refinery and finishing at product reaching the consumer.     
 
 
Figure A-1:  Production Process (Adopted from Chesnes (2009)) 
The petroleum industry was split into five Petroleum Administration for Defense 
Districts (PADDs) based on geographic location during WWII; see Figure A-2 below 
(Trench, 2001).  Parformak (2007) discussed geographic concentration of critical 
infrastructure across numerous sectors and policy methods for encouraging dispersion.  
Specifically, Texas and Louisiana (PADD 2) refineries account for over 43% of the total 
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U.S. refining capacity (Parformak, 2007).  Oil refineries are categorized under the energy 
sector within the critical infrastructure domain.  During Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
refinery capability was reduced 13 percent and 14 percent, correspondingly.  Due to 
reduced capacity, the hurricanes caused gas prices to rise from $1.10 to $2.55 after the 
disasters (Seesel, 2006).  The cost is an increase that has not been recovered from and 
contributes to the economic recession.  In addition, increased petroleum demand in the 
past twenty years has increased at a faster rate than refining capability to provide gas, 
diesel, and other petroleum products.  According to GAO-09-87, refineries are producing 
at a level very near their maximum capacity across the United States (Rusco, 2008).  As a 
result, a disaster, either natural or terrorist, could potentially result in large shortages for a 
given time period. 
 
 
 
Figure A-2: PADD District Map (adopted from EIA-DoE) 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) fuel costs represented nearly 1.2 percent of 
total DoD spending during FY2000 and increased to nearly 3.0 percent by FY2008 
(Andrews, 2009).  Andrews (2009) stated that over the same period, total defense 
spending doubled and fuel costs increased 500 percent from $3.6 billion to $17.9 billion.  
Nearly 97.7 billion barrels of jet fuel were consumed in FY2008 and represents nearly 
71% of all fuel purchased in the DoD.  According to the Air Force Infrastructure Energy 
Plan, the fuel bill for the Air Force exceeds $10 million dollars per day and every $10 per 
barrel fuel price increase drives costs up $600 million dollars per year (2010).  In 2007, 
the Air Force spent $67.7 million on ground fuel energy and consumed 31.2 million 
gallons of petroleum.  The ground fuel energy only accounts for 4 percent of all fuel costs 
(Air Force Energy Infrastructure Plan, 2010).    
With the advance of technology, critical infrastructure systems have become 
increasingly connected and automated.  Due to coupling, in 1996, the Presidential 
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection was established (Robinson, Woodard, 
& Varnado, 1999).  After a 15-month study, the commission concluded that 1) 
infrastructure is at serious risk, 2) no warning system is in place, 3) government and 
industry does not efficiently share information that might give warning of attack, and 4) 
federal R&D budgets do not include study of threats of component systems in 
infrastructure.  Dependency is defined as a linkage or connection between two 
infrastructures, through which the state of one infrastructure influences another (Rinaldi, 
Peerenboom, & and Kelly, 2001).  Rinaldi, et al. (2001) discussed four types of 
interdependencies: physical, cyber, geographic, and logical.  
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Risk Analysis 
The concept of risk and risk assessments have a long history, and date back more than 
2,400 years ago when the Athenians utilized their risk assessment methods before making 
decisions in war (Aven, 2003).  Understanding and measuring risk against consequences 
has been one of the foundational pillars of western society.   Risk analysis is commonly 
used to describe the uncertainty involved with events that affect the financial market, 
health industry, and critical infrastructure.  In both business and government, leaders are 
faced with decisions and information that has uncertainty.  Understanding the uncertainty 
provides the baseline for making better decisions (Vose, 2008).     
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 established the Homeland Security 
Department (HSD) in order to protect key resources and infrastructure from disaster, 
ultimately to reduce the impact of terrorist attacks on the United States.  Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive Number 7 (HSPD-7) stated the Secretary of Homeland 
security was responsible for coordinating the overall national effort to identify, prioritize, 
and protect critical infrastructure and resources.  HSPD-7 also designated agencies 
responsible for conducting analyses and directed HSD to produce a comprehensive, 
integrated plan for critical infrastructure.   
When discussing risk, vulnerability, consequence, and threat are also involved in 
most methods for computing risk and also discussions about risk.  Lowrance (1976) 
introduced risk as a measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects.  Cox 
(2008) provides generally-accepted definitions for each of these terms.  Risk is defined as 
the potential for loss or harm due to the likelihood of an unwanted event and the 
consequences of the event.  Consequence is the outcome of the event that includes any 
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losses of capability or ability to operate normally.  Threat is any indication, circumstance, 
or location that places an asset or event with the potential to cause damage.  Vulnerability 
is any weakness in the asset or system infrastructure design that can be exploited (Cox, 
2008). 
In order to better define risk methodology and objectives, Kaplan and Garrick (1981) 
and Haimes (1991) introduce six questions to form the foundation of risk analysis and 
risk management: 
1.  What can go wrong? 
2.  What is the likelihood? 
3.  What are the consequences? 
4.  What can be done and what options are available? 
5.  What is the trade-off between cost, benefit, and risk? 
6.  What are the impacts of current decisions on future options? 
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (Chertoff, 2009) constructed a risk 
framework that is based on combination of the basic risk assessment and management 
process.  This framework established the process for combining consequence, 
vulnerability, and threat information to produce assessments of national or sector risk.  
The risk management framework is a continuous feedback loop to enhance infrastructure 
protection by focusing efforts into six steps: 
1.  Set Goals and Objectives 
2.  Identify Systems and Networks 
3.  Assess Risks 
4.  Prioritize  
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5.  Implement Programs 
6.  Measure Effectiveness 
The framework identified above is the basis across the risk analysis profession and is 
utilized in the majority of risk assessment methodologies.  Toeffler (1980) discussed the 
importance and impact on decision-making at all levels, and the complexity of the risk 
assessment management process calls for continuous learning. 
Rinaldi, Peerenboom, et al. (2001) discussed interdependencies, coupling and 
response behavior, and types of failures with respect to critical infrastructure across the 
U.S.  Four general categories were developed to describe the relationship between 
infrastructures:  1) Physical – reliance on flow from one infrastructure to another, 2) 
Cyber – reliance on information transfer between infrastructures, 3) Geographic – local 
environmental impacts affect multiple infrastructures due to proximity, and 4) Logical – a 
dependency that exists that does not fall into the above categories.  Chai, Liu, et al. (Chai, 
et al., 2008) utilized a social network analysis to evaluate the relationship between 
infrastructure risk and interdependencies. 
Solano (2010) investigated vulnerability assessment methods for determining risk 
of critical infrastructure and spatial distribution appeared to be an area where research 
can be expanded.    Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly (2001) discussed the challenges of 
modeling multiple interdependent infrastructures due to volume of data required and that 
isolation of infrastructure does not adequately analyze behavior of the system. 
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Natural Disaster Risk Analysis Methods 
Department of Homeland Security Risk Analysis 
In the United States Governments’ Risk Assessment Methods, there have been 
three phases of formulas in the past decade (Masse, O'Neil, & Rollins, 2007).  In the first 
phase that spanned FY2001 to FY2003, the Department of Justice was responsible for 
handling risk and risk equated to population.  In the second phase which spanned FY2004 
to FY2005, risk was the sum of threat (T), critical infrastructure (CI), and population 
density.  In the third phase, which is currently still in practice, the probability of events 
was systematically introduced into the formula.   Equation 1 shows the new approach in 
which risk is a function of threat (T), vulnerability (V), and consequence (C) variables.  
    Risk = f ( T, V, C)              (1) 
In the review of this method by the national research council, multiplying the 
variables together produces acceptable and state-of-the-art natural disaster risk 
quantification (Ahearne, 2010).   
Leontief-Based Input-Ouput Method 
Haimes (2001) introduces the idea of modeling the dynamics of infrastructures 
using the Input-output Inoperability Method (IIM).  Two other models were also 
developed based on this approach and include Multi-Regional IIM (MR-IIM) and 
Dynamic IIM (D-IIM) (Haimes, Santos, Crowther, Henry, Lian, & Yan, 2007).   The IIM 
methods measure the disruption from one or more sectors and the ripple effects measured 
in terms of inoperability and economic loss.  The benefit of this model is the modeling 
and analysis of interdependencies between different sectors and critical infrastructures. 
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In order to do the introductory interdependency analysis, Haimes (2004) provided 
a construct to breakdown complex systems utilizing Hiearchical Holographic Models 
(HHM).  This approach allows the breakdown of complex models in a way that provides 
a comprehensive and useful product for policy analysis and formulation.  Several 
variations of the HHM framework have been derived and provide different points of view 
for analyzing risk.   
Simulation and Modeling  
Yeletaysi, Fiedrich, and Harrald (2008) introduce integrating ArcGIS9 with a 
systems approach to yield the operational effects of disruptions in the supply chain.  In 
this approach, the GIS model was utilized to manage the databases for the spatial and 
tabular data.  ARENA 11.0 software was utilized to construct a mixed simulation model 
that lays out the elements of the system and the connections between the elements.  A 
Monte Carlo simulation was utilized to remove nodes and determine impact of each 
component of the infrastructure.  The combination of the simulation and GIS software 
provides the capability to analyze both the spatial and supply chain dynamics.  The data 
required for these analyses included shapefiles of the elements of the system, capacity 
inputs and outputs, and relational connections between the infrastructures.  The output of 
the model provides the vulnerabilities of the petroleum system and potential extent of the 
disruptions.   
Johansson and Hassel (2010) utilize a similar approach to model systemic 
vulnerability as a function of three types of vulnerability:  1) global system property that 
expresses intent of adverse effects caused by an event, 2) system component or aspect of 
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the system, or 3) spatial geographic locations.  In this analysis, a network model was 
produced tying together the functional dependencies, temporal aspects, strains, and 
translated all of these aspects into a computer code to run in a simulation program.  A 
global vulnerability analysis was completed by removing components and evaluating the 
consequences of removing the component.   This approach provided the means to identify 
critical locations and components.   The benefits of this approach is that it accounts for 
functional and geographic dependency; however, one downside to this approach is the 
amount of data required, the detailed nature of the data required, and the computational 
power required to analyze the data.    
Case Study Analysis 
Zimmerman (2004) utilizes a case-study analysis to determine the components 
that failed and the sequence of failures.  Interdependencies between infrastructures were 
analyzed to sort cascading failures from general mono-infrastructure failures.  This led to 
the classification of infrastructures into three categories: infrastructure that frequently 
caused failure of other infrastructure, infrastructure frequently affected by other 
infrastructures, and ratio of cause of failure relative to affected by failure.  The benefit of 
this analysis is that it provides pattern detection of infrastructures that frequently cause 
disruptions to other infrastructures.   
Terrorism Risk Analysis Methods 
Guikema and Aven (2010) summarize the key models and approaches taken to 
assess uncertainties and severity of consequences in terrorist and other attacks.  Major 
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players were identified as the framework to provide decision makers with results from 
conditional risk analysis methods.   
Game Theory 
Mathematical game theory was invented by John Von Neumann and Oskar 
Morgenstern (Ross, 2010).  Initially, the framework that made the theory applicable was 
only valid under special and limited conditions.  Over the past 70 years, major advances 
and refinements have generalized and allowed for greater use across many scientific 
fields.   Only recently has game theory been expanded to risk analysis of infrastructure.   
In these analyses, attacker/defender scenarios are modeled and sides make decisions 
based on the moves of the other player.  This provides an intelligent attacker and 
defender scenario that more closely resembles the terrorist intentions for attacking 
targets.  According to Guikema (2009), the focus of game theoretic work was to answer 
strategic and policy-level questions about impact of terrorist attacks.  Paté-Cornell and 
Guikema (2002) combined game theory and probabilistic risk methods, described below, 
to produce an approach to set priorities in countermeasures.   
Probabilistic Risk Method 
Guikema and Aven (2010) discussed the use of probabilistic risk analysis 
methods to provide the framework for thinking about systems facing intelligent attack.  In 
this method, probability event trees are utilized in combination with expert knowledge to 
create the chances of failing the system.  There are several criticisms of utilizing a 
probabilistic method for calculating risk.  First, uncertainties in the estimates are strongly 
dependent on the assessors (Guikema & Aven, 2010).   A second disadvantage is that it 
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does not incorporate strategic objectives of attackers and defenders.  Finally, this 
approach has been subject to strong criticism about the meaning of the frequencies and 
the rate of an attack.   
Mohtadi (2005) discussed using extreme value statistics to determine probability 
of events that are rare in occurrence and extreme in magnitude.  The extreme value theory 
is a limiting theorem that allows for measuring the distribution of maxima of events.  
Utilizing extreme value statistics has been adopted previously in weather patterns, 
earthquakes, and global warming (Mohtadi, 2005).  Barker and Haimes (2009) discuss 
utilizing an extreme event uncertainty sensitivity index method (EE-USIM) to calculate 
and analyze sensitivity of extreme event consequences with respect to uncertainty in the 
parameters.  This approach was combined with IIM to strengthen expert-elicited 
probability parameters.  
Network Security Risk Analysis  
To assess the risk of cyber-attacks on process control networks, the Network Security 
Risk Model was developed by Haimes and Henry (Haimes, Santos, Crowther, Henry, 
Lian, & Yan, 2007).  These scenario-based models assess different attack types and 
objectives to determine facility disruptions that would arise as a result of the attack.   
Qualitative Risk Analysis 
Several qualitative methods for risk have been adapted and used to aid 
quantitative risk analysis to add expert opinion about factors that exist that are difficult to 
characterize.  Terrorism risk and intentions often do not follow logical assumptions or 
decisions.  In Ontario, Canada, risk analysts at the Ontario Ministry of Agriculture and 
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Food (OMAF) commented that if adequate data is unavailable, quantitative tools do not 
have the ability to provide a sufficient risk analysis even preferred (Cox, Babayev, & 
Huber, 2005).  Methods to obtain, refine, and communicate judgment of experts and 
include discussion into risk analysis provides the means to supplement quantitative data.  
Delphi methods have been utilized to filter expert opinion into usable data for analysis 
(Ludlow, 2002).  Empirical phenomenological research also provides an approach to 
provide a deeper understanding of the events and phenomenon that occur (Cohen & 
Daniels, 2003).  Cox, Babayev, and Huber (2005)  
Geographic Information Systems  
Nearly 40 years ago, Tobler (1970) stated that “nearly everything is related to 
everything else, but near things are more related than distant things.”  This became 
Tobler’s First Law of Geography and is acknowledged as the foundation of geographic 
information systems and science.  Longley, Goodchild, Maguire, and Rind (2011) 
discussed spatial autocorrelation as a tool that allows us to describe the interrelatedness 
of events and relationships that exist across space.  Griffith (2009) discussed spatial 
autocorrelation as “a dependency exists between values of a variable…or a systematic 
pattern in values of a variable across the locations on a map due to underlying common 
factors.”  Shih, et al. (2009) used spatial tools to manage both geospatial and non-
geospatial data in order to analyze the vulnerability of electric power grid systems.   
Sabatowski (2010) also utilized geographic information systems to evaluate vulnerability 
of electric outages at U.S. military installations.  Geographic Information Systems 
provide a toolset to both statistically and visually identify trends in data.   
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Perry, Liebhold, et al. (2002) discussed the methods for selecting statistical 
methods to quantify spatial pattern.  Table 1 shows a summary of the description of the 
methods and the type of data that each method requires.  While this list is not a 
comprehensive of all spatial methods, the methods here seek to compare features of the 
spatial process at some local reference point with the same features at a different location.  
There are three types of models that are based on the types of data: point-referenced data, 
point-referenced data with attributes, and area referenced data.   
Table A-1: Methods for Analysis of Spatial Patterns  
(Adapted from Perry, et al. (2002)) 
 
Method Type of Data Original Use 
Model 
Based? 
Hypothesis 
Test? 
Information 
at Multiple 
Scales? 
Local 
Spatial 
Pattern? 
1- or 2- 
Dimension 
Irregularly 
Spaced 
Units 
Ripley’s K and L Point       (x, y) 
Plant 
ecology No Yes Yes No Both Yes 
Quadrant Variance 
Methods 
Point       
(x, z) 
Plant 
ecology No Rarely Yes No 1 No 
Block Quadrant 
Variance Methods 
Point with 
attribute 
(x, y, a) 
Plant 
ecology No Rarely Yes No 2 No 
Correlograms 
(Moran’s I, 
Geary’s c) 
Point with 
attribute 
(x, y, a) 
Geography No Yes Yes No Both Yes 
Geostatistics 
(variograms) PQV (x, y, z) 
Earth 
Sciences No No Yes No Both Yes 
Geostatistics 
(Kriging) (x, y, z) 
Earth 
Sciences Yes Yes Yes No Both Yes 
Angular 
Correlation (x, y, z) Geography No Yes No No 2 Yes 
Wavelets (x, y, z) Statistics No No Yes Yes Both No 
SADIE (x, y, z) Insect Ecology No Yes No Yes Both Yes 
Landscape Ecology 
Metrics  
Area 
referenced 
attribute 
(A, a) 
Landscape 
ecology Rarely Rarely No No 2 Yes 
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Variance Mean 
Methods (Morisita, 
Taylor, etc.) 
Attributes 
only (a) 
Applied 
entomology No Yes No No Both Yes 
Nearest neighbor 
methods 
Attributes 
only (a) 
Plant 
Ecology/ 
Forestry 
No Yes No No Both Yes 
 
71 
Appendix B.  Expanded Methodology 
The overarching goal of this research is to establish a process and develop 
techniques that can be expanded to look at the risk to both the critical infrastructure 
system and critical components of the system. The Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) introduced the risk function as a combination of threat, vulnerability, and 
consequence, displayed below as Equation 1.   
Risk = f (Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence)        (B-1) 
In the literature review, two aspects of risk were identified that are currently not 
captured directly in the equation were identified.  The spatial relationship of 
infrastructure and coupling effects were identified as system effects that are currently 
unaccounted for.  This research proposes the addition of two elements to the DHS risk 
equation: 1) spatial relationship (SR) and 2) coupling effect (CE).  The resulting equation 
is shown below as Equation 2.   
Risk = f (Threat, Vulnerability, Consequence, SR, CE)              (B-2) 
Data Collection 
Data were compiled from public government records and public sources.  Oil 
production characteristics were obtained from the United States Energy Information 
Administration and were geo-referenced with latitude and longitude coordinates to 
connect production characteristics and location.   The annual hurricane probability map 
based on data from 1944-1999 was used to determine threat for each refinery based on 
information available from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.  
Vulnerability data were not included in either analysis due to security concerns.   
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Spatial Relationship and Coupling Effect Development 
In order to develop the spatial relationship, the first step is to confirm that a spatial 
relationship exists.  This requires the statistical analysis of oil refinery data with respect 
to location and output to determine if the system is related spatially.  Geographic 
Information Systems provide the ability to analyze the data using Geo-statistics to 
determine what kind of relationship exists.  Two tools are appropriate to analyze the 
spatial correlation: Global Moran’s I and Cluster and Outlier Analysis.  Global Moran’s I 
provide whether the data is correlated across the entire spatial area and Cluster and 
Outlier Analysis determines whether clusters exist within smaller spatial areas.   
The spatial autocorrelation (Global Moran’s I) tool measures spatial correlation 
based on feature locations and feature attributes simultaneously (ESRI, 2010).  The 
output of the tool is an evaluation of whether patterns are clustered, dispersed, or random.  
The tool calculates values for the Moran’s I Index Value, z-score, and p-value. The 
spatial autocorrelation tool requires that interpretation is made within context of standard 
hypothesis testing.  In order to properly assess the Moran’s I tool, some general 
guidelines have been established:  1) input feature class must contain at least 30 features, 
2) appropriate distance conceptualization function, 3) distance band appropriateness, and 
4) row standardization necessary.   
Cluster and Outlier Analysis (Anselin’s Local I) provides the toolset to identify 
spatial clusters with features that are similar in magnitude and location.  The Local 
Indicator of Spatial Association (LISA) provides indications as to whether there is 
73 
statistically significant clustering of observations with a certain attribute value (Anselin, 
1995).  This provides the means to determine hot spots and local significance maps with 
respect to the global region (Feser & Sweeney, 2006).   Additionally, the Local I value 
for each refinery will be utilized to determine the spatial relationship of that refinery to 
other nearby refineries.   
 Coupling effects and interdependencies of infrastructure have been verified and 
discussed by several other research efforts (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, & and Kelly, 2001; 
Haimes, Santos, Crowther, Henry, Lian, & Yan, 2007; Robinson, Woodard, & Varnado, 
1999; Chai, et al., 2008).  Utilizing network analysis for infrastructure provides an 
opportunity to determine the number of connections to other infrastructure.  These 
connections are the key coupling points and add potential for failure to other critical 
infrastructure.  The number of connections between infrastructures will be determined to 
create the coupling effect layer using cocitation and bibliographic coupling.  A 13x13 
Matrix (A) was set up to represent each of the different critical infrastructure systems as 
specified within the  with a value of 1 representing a connection to another infrastructure 
and a value of 0 representing no connection to another infrastructure.  Cocitation (C), 
Equation B-3, was used to calculate the number of common neighbors within the 
network.   
C = AAT      (B-3) 
Due to the relationships within matrix A, Cocitation and Bibliographic Coupling methods 
yield the same result and can be used to ensure that the connections between the 
infrastructures were represented correctly.  The resulting matrix provides the number of 
common neighbors sorted by infrastructure.  The CE metric was established by using the 
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ratio of the total number of common neighbors and total possible number of common 
neighbors.  This ratio characterizes how interdependent each individual critical 
infrastructure system is and their relation to other critical infrastructures.   
Risk Equation Analysis  
In the case of natural disasters, each of the risk equations multiplied equally 
weighted variables to produce a risk value.   In the review of this method by the national 
research council, multiplying the variables together produces acceptable and state-of-the-
art natural disaster risk quantification (Ahearne, 2010).   
Following calculation of the risk scores, a risk map was generated using the 
Inverse Distance Weighting (IDW) method to visually show high-risk areas to refineries.  
There are several methods available to interpolate between values and the most common 
are inverse distance weighting (IDW), splining, and kriging.  While the visual 
representation may not identify causes of potential events, it can be used to look at trends 
and determine high risk areas that require mitigation strategies.  Childs (2004) discusses 
two categories of interpolation techniques: deterministic and geostatistical.  Methods 
such as IDW and Splining fall into the deterministic method category which is based on 
measured points or mathematical formulas.  Kriging uses geostatistical technique 
category and is based on advanced prediction surface modeling that includes the measure 
of certainty.  Sabatowski (2010) used IDW because of the flexibility to weight closer data 
points more heavily than those far away.  Due to the nature of natural disaster risk, where 
near points may be within the zone of influence of the event, this approach appears to be 
the best option of the tools available.   
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A comparison of the DHS risk equation and modified risk equation was 
completed to establish whether there is a statistical difference between the risk values.  
The dataset of risk values were determined to be non-normal, and as a result, the 
Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test is appropriate to assess whether the population mean ranks 
differ.  
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Appendix C.  Expanded Results 
Moran’s I Results 
The Moran’s I statistical analysis provides the ability to determine whether a 
spatial data attribute is dispersed, random, or clustered.  In this case, a positive Moran’s 
index number indicates that the pattern of oil refineries is clustered.  If the Moran’s index 
number were negative, it would be expected that the pattern is dispersed.  A value close 
to zero indicates a random pattern.  The z-score and p-value provide context within the 
Moran’s I index.  A high z-score and low p-value shows statistically that there is a low 
probability that the clustered pattern is random.   
 
 
77 
Cluster and Outlier Results 
The cluster and outlier analysis looks at local, or in this case, regional impacts of 
an attribute and the relationship with nearby neighbors.  Each refinery is then categorized 
into one of five categories (Not Significant, HH, HL, LH, or LL) based on the statistical 
significance of the relationship with its neighbors.  HH indicates that the refinery is high-
output, clustered; HL shows that the refinery is high output, but surrounded by generally 
low neighbors; LH indicates a refinery that is low output in a clustered, high-output area; 
and LL indicates a low-output refinery located within a low-output area.  In the case of 
oil refineries, output was the attribute analyzed and resulted in 24 of 146 being 
categorized as either HH or HL.  This resulted in three areas being identified as high-
output, clustered in a small geographic area.  Two of them, Great Lakes and West Coast 
regions, were considered major high-output, clustered area.  The West Coast region is 
high-output, and based on further examination, was included in the findings as high-
output clustered. 
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Coupling Effect Matrix 
The coupling effect matrix provides the relationship between each of the different 
infrastructure systems, as defined by the National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection.   This is the basis for calculating the first order neighbors for each of the 
different infrastructures.    
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Banking 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Government 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Transportation 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Defense Industrial Base 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Communications 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Postal and Shipping 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Chemical Industry 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Energy 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Food 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Emergency Services 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Agriculture 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Public Health 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 
Water 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
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Transform Matrix 
The transform matrix is used to determine the number of neighbors to in the 
network to each of the infrastructure sectors.  This in effect allows for the calculation of 
how many connections, or interdependencies, each infrastructure has.   
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Banking 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 
Government 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Transportation 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Defense Industrial Base 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Communications 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Postal and Shipping 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Chemical Industry 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 
Energy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Food 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Emergency Services 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Agriculture 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Public Health 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Water 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 
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Cocitation Matrix 
The Cocitation matrix is the result of the multiplication of the coupling effect 
matrix and the transform matrix.  Each of these cell values represents the number of 
nearby neighbors.  By taking the sum of each column, the total number of 
interdependencies for each infrastructure is calculated.    
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Banking 7 5 6 2 6 3 5 5 1 2 2 1 4 
Government 5 10 6 2 7 3 6 7 1 3 2 0 4 
Transportation 6 6 9 1 9 2 6 6 1 1 2 1 3 
Defense Industrial Base 2 2 1 3 2 1 1 3 1 3 0 1 3 
Communications 6 7 9 2 10 2 7 7 1 2 2 1 4 
Postal and Shipping 3 3 2 1 2 3 2 2 0 1 1 0 2 
Chemical Industry 5 6 6 1 7 2 7 4 0 1 2 0 3 
Energy 5 7 6 3 7 2 4 10 2 4 0 1 5 
Food 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 2 2 0 1 2 
Emergency Services 2 3 1 3 2 1 1 4 2 4 0 1 4 
Agriculture 2 2 2 0 2 1 2 0 0 0 2 0 1 
Public Health 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
Water 4 4 3 3 4 2 3 5 2 4 1 1 6 
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Coupling Effect Calculation 
 The coupling effect variable is defined in this research as the ratio of connections 
to the max number of connections.  Since equal weighting is required for the risk 
equation, the coupling effect numbers were normalized prior to input into the modified 
risk equation.  The top three most interdependent infrastructures are communications, 
energy, and government.   
 
Column Total Max Shared Connections 
Raw 
Coupling 
Effect 
Coupling 
Effect 
Banking 42 144 0.29 0.83 
Government 46 144 0.32 0.91 
Transportation 44 144 0.31 0.87 
Defense Industrial Base 20 144 0.14 0.40 
Communications 50 144 0.35 1.00 
Postal and Shipping 19 144 0.13 0.38 
Chemical Industry 37 144 0.26 0.73 
Energy 46 144 0.32 0.91 
Food 12 144 0.08 0.24 
Emergency Services 24 144 0.17 0.48 
Agriculture 12 144 0.08 0.24 
Public Health 8 144 0.06 0.16 
Water 36 144 0.25 0.71 
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Risk Equation Analysis 
 The risk equation analysis combined each of the different variables for the two 
equations.  For natural disasters, multiplying the variables together is the generally 
accepted methodology.  The raw risk values would generally be used to determine where 
to apply limited resources.  In this case, the risk values were normalized in order to 
visually compare each of the risk equations using geographic information systems.  The 
result is presented in the Chapter 4 of this research on pages 40-41.  Below are the 
calculations of risk for each of the 146 refineries under threat of a hurricane in the Gulf 
Coast. 
Name State Owner T V C SR CE Raw 
Trad 
Risk 
Trad 
Risk 
Raw 
Mod 
Risk 
Mod 
Risk 
Baytown 
Refinery 
TX ExxonMobil 0.37 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.91 0.37 1.00 0.31 1.00 
Texas City 
Refinery 
TX BP 0.40 1.00 0.83 0.78 0.91 0.33 0.90 0.24 0.76 
Baton Rouge 
Refinery 
LA ExxonMobil 0.40 1.00 0.90 0.59 0.91 0.36 0.97 0.19 0.63 
Lake Charles 
Refinery 
LA Citgo 0.35 1.00 0.76 0.63 0.91 0.27 0.72 0.15 0.49 
Garyville 
Refinery 
LA Marathon 
Petroleum 
0.37 1.00 0.78 0.54 0.91 0.29 0.78 0.14 0.45 
Beaumont 
Refinery 
TX ExxonMobil 0.35 1.00 0.63 0.62 0.91 0.22 0.60 0.13 0.40 
Port Arthur 
Refinery 
TX Valero 0.41 1.00 0.58 0.58 0.91 0.24 0.64 0.12 0.40 
Port Arthur 
Refinery 
TX Motiva 
Enterprises 
0.41 1.00 0.51 0.49 0.91 0.21 0.57 0.09 0.30 
Deer Park 
Refinery 
TX Shell Oil 0.31 1.00 0.60 0.55 0.91 0.19 0.50 0.09 0.30 
St Charles 
Refinery 
LA Valero 0.42 1.00 0.47 0.33 0.91 0.20 0.53 0.06 0.19 
Houston 
Refinery 
TX Lyondell 0.28 1.00 0.48 0.44 0.91 0.13 0.36 0.05 0.17 
Convent 
Refinery 
LA Motiva 
Enterprises 
0.38 1.00 0.46 0.33 0.91 0.17 0.47 0.05 0.17 
Alliance 
Refinery 
LA ConocoPhillips 0.42 1.00 0.45 0.30 0.91 0.19 0.51 0.05 0.17 
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Norco Refinery LA Motiva 
Enterprises 
0.42 1.00 0.43 0.31 0.91 0.18 0.49 0.05 0.16 
Lake Charles 
Refinery 
LA ConocoPhillips 0.35 1.00 0.44 0.36 0.91 0.15 0.42 0.05 0.16 
Texas City 
Refinery 
TX Valero 0.40 1.00 0.38 0.32 0.91 0.15 0.41 0.04 0.14 
Pascagoula 
Refinery 
MS Chevron 0.36 1.00 0.58 0.22 0.91 0.21 0.56 0.04 0.13 
Sweeny 
Refinery 
TX ConocoPhillips 0.34 1.00 0.41 0.32 0.91 0.14 0.38 0.04 0.13 
Chalmette 
Refinery 
LA ExxonMobil & 
PDVSA 
0.44 1.00 0.35 0.23 0.91 0.15 0.42 0.03 0.10 
Port Arthur 
Refinery 
TX Total 0.41 1.00 0.31 0.25 0.91 0.13 0.34 0.03 0.09 
Corpus Christi 
Complex 
TX Flint Hills 
Resources 
0.26 1.00 0.52 0.22 0.91 0.14 0.37 0.03 0.09 
Bayway 
Refinery 
NJ ConocoPhillips 0.32 1.00 0.41 0.14 0.91 0.13 0.35 0.02 0.05 
Philadelphia 
Refinery 
PA Sunoco 0.23 1.00 0.60 0.12 0.91 0.14 0.37 0.01 0.05 
Paulsboro 
Refinery 
NJ Valero 0.33 1.00 0.29 0.13 0.91 0.10 0.26 0.01 0.04 
Eagle Point 
Refinery 
NJ Sunoco 0.34 1.00 0.26 0.13 0.91 0.09 0.24 0.01 0.03 
Meraux 
Refinery 
LA Murphy Oil 0.39 1.00 0.22 0.13 0.91 0.09 0.23 0.01 0.03 
Corpus Christi 
Refinery 
TX Citgo 0.26 1.00 0.28 0.15 0.91 0.07 0.20 0.01 0.03 
Corpus Christi 
West Refinery 
TX Valero 0.26 1.00 0.25 0.14 0.91 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.03 
Trainer 
Refinery 
PA ConocoPhillips 0.20 1.00 0.33 0.14 0.91 0.07 0.18 0.01 0.03 
Marcus Hook 
Refinery 
PA Sunoco 0.20 1.00 0.31 0.14 0.91 0.06 0.17 0.01 0.02 
Corpus Christi 
East Refinery 
TX Valero 0.26 1.00 0.21 0.12 0.91 0.05 0.15 0.01 0.02 
Perth Amboy 
Refinery 
NJ Chevron 0.30 1.00 0.14 0.12 0.91 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.01 
Saraland 
Refinery 
AL Shell Oil 0.33 1.00 0.14 0.10 0.91 0.05 0.12 0.00 0.01 
Port Reading 
Refinery 
NJ Hess 0.32 1.00 0.11 0.11 0.91 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.01 
Pasadena 
Refinery 
TX Petrobras 0.29 1.00 0.18 0.07 0.91 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.01 
Independent 
Refinery 
TX Stratnor 0.28 1.00 0.18 0.07 0.91 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.01 
Three Rivers 
Refinery 
TX Valero 0.17 1.00 0.16 0.11 0.91 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01 
Paulsboro 
Asphalt 
Refinery 
NJ NuStar Energy 0.29 1.00 0.09 0.11 0.91 0.03 0.07 0.00 0.01 
Krotz Springs 
Refinery 
LA Alon USA 0.28 1.00 0.15 0.06 0.91 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.01 
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Savannah 
Refinery 
GA NuStar Energy 0.40 1.00 0.05 0.11 0.91 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 
Catlettsburg 
Refinery 
KY Marathon 
Petroleum 
0.04 1.00 0.40 0.13 0.91 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.01 
Whiting 
Refinery 
IN BP 0.01 1.00 0.73 0.21 0.91 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Houston 
Refinery 
TX Valero 0.28 1.00 0.15 0.03 0.91 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.00 
Tuscaloosa 
Refinery 
AL Hunt Refining 0.14 1.00 0.09 0.10 0.91 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 
El Dorado 
Refinery 
AR El Dorado 0.08 1.00 0.13 0.11 0.91 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Wood River 
Refinery 
IL ConocoPhillips 0.01 1.00 0.55 0.17 0.91 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Joliet Refinery IL ExxonMobil 0.01 1.00 0.43 0.19 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Shreveport 
Refinery 
LA Calumet 
Lubricants 
0.15 1.00 0.06 0.08 0.91 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Pine Bend 
Refinery 
MN Flint Hills 
Resources 
0.01 1.00 0.57 0.12 0.91 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Robinson 
Refinery 
IL Marathon 
Petroleum 
0.01 1.00 0.39 0.15 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Mobile Refery AL Gulf Atlantic 
Refining & 
Marketing 
0.34 1.00 0.03 0.06 0.91 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 
El Paso 
Refinery 
TX Western 
Refining 
0.02 1.00 0.22 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Richmond 
Refinery 
CA Chevron 0.01 1.00 0.44 0.11 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Memphis 
Refinery 
TN Valero 0.01 1.00 0.32 0.14 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Cherry Point 
Refinery 
WA BP 0.01 1.00 0.40 0.11 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Ponca City 
Refinery 
OK ConocoPhillips 0.01 1.00 0.35 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Lemont 
Refinery 
IL Citgo 0.01 1.00 0.29 0.15 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
North Pole 
Refinery 
AK Flint Hills 
Resources 
0.01 1.00 0.38 0.11 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Toledo 
Refinery 
OH Sunoco 0.01 1.00 0.29 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Toledo 
Refinery 
OH BP/Husky Oil 0.01 1.00 0.29 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Lima Refinery OH Husky Energy 0.01 1.00 0.28 0.14 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Golden Eagle 
Refinery 
CA Tesoro 0.01 1.00 0.30 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
McKee 
Refinery 
TX Valero 0.01 1.00 0.28 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Martinez 
Refinery 
CA Shell Oil 0.01 1.00 0.28 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Borger 
Refinery 
TX ConocoPhillips 0.01 1.00 0.26 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
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Benicia 
Refinery 
CA Valero 0.01 1.00 0.26 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Tyler Refinery TX Delek Refining 
Ltd 
0.04 1.00 0.10 0.08 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Shell Anacortes 
Refinery 
WA Shell Oil 0.01 1.00 0.26 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Vicksburg 
Refinery 
MS Ergon 0.15 1.00 0.04 0.05 0.91 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Wilmington 
Refinery 
CA Valero 0.01 1.00 0.27 0.11 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Torrance 
Refinery 
CA ExxonMobil 0.01 1.00 0.27 0.11 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Wilmington 
Refinery 
CA Tesoro 0.01 1.00 0.24 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
El Dorado 
Refinery 
KS El Dorado 0.01 1.00 0.22 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Wilmington 
Refinery 
CA Shell Oil 0.01 1.00 0.18 0.14 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Coffeyville 
Refinery 
KS Coffeyville 
Resources 
LLC 
0.01 1.00 0.20 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Tesoro 
Anacortes 
Refinery 
WA Tesoro 0.01 1.00 0.19 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
ConocoPhillips 
Ferndale 
Refinery 
WA ConocoPhillips 0.01 1.00 0.19 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Commerce City 
Refinery 
CO Suncor Energy 0.01 1.00 0.18 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Artesia 
Refinery 
NM Holly 
Corporation 
0.01 1.00 0.18 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Rodeo San 
Francisco 
Refinery 
CA ConocoPhillips 0.01 1.00 0.18 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Kapolei 
Refinery 
HI Tesoro 0.01 1.00 0.17 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Detroit 
Refinery 
MI Marathon 
Petroleum 
0.01 1.00 0.18 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bakersfield 
Refinery 
CA Alon USA 0.01 1.00 0.12 0.17 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
McPherson 
Refinery 
KS NCRA 0.01 1.00 0.15 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tulsa Refinery OK Holly 
Corporation 
0.01 1.00 0.15 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sinclair 
Refinery 
WY Sinclair Oil 0.01 1.00 0.12 0.15 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Salt Lake City 
Refinery 
UT Tesoro 0.01 1.00 0.10 0.18 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cotton Valley 
Refinery 
LA Calumet 
Lubricants 
0.11 1.00 0.02 0.08 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Lake Charles 
Refinery 
LA Calcasieu 
Refining 
0.35 1.00 0.05 0.01 0.91 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Kenai Refinery AK Tesoro 0.01 1.00 0.13 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Warren 
Refinery 
PA United 
Refining 
0.01 1.00 0.13 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Billings 
Refinery 
MT ExxonMobil 0.01 1.00 0.11 0.15 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Canton 
Refinery 
OH Marathon 
Petroleum 
0.01 1.00 0.13 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wynnewood 
Refinery 
OK Wynnewood 0.01 1.00 0.13 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tulsa Refinery OK Sinclair Oil 0.01 1.00 0.13 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Laurel Refinery MT Cenex 0.01 1.00 0.10 0.16 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ardmore 
Refinery 
OK Valero 0.01 1.00 0.13 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Billings 
Refinery 
MT ConocoPhillips 0.01 1.00 0.10 0.15 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Salt Lake City 
Refinery 
UT Chevron 0.01 1.00 0.08 0.19 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Paramount 
Refinery 
CA Paramount 
Petroleum 
0.01 1.00 0.09 0.17 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
St Paul Park 
Refinery 
MN Marathon 
Petroleum 
0.01 1.00 0.13 0.11 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mandan 
Refinery 
ND Tesoro 0.01 1.00 0.11 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Rogerslacy 
Refinery 
MS Hunt 
Southland 
Refining 
0.12 1.00 0.02 0.06 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
San Antonio 
Refinery 
TX Age Refining 0.12 1.00 0.02 0.06 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Santa Maria 
Refinery 
CA ConocoPhillips 0.01 1.00 0.08 0.17 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Yorktown 
Refinery 
VA Western 
Refining 
0.01 1.00 0.11 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Kapolei 
Refinery 
HI Chevron 0.01 1.00 0.10 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Cheyenne 
Refinery 
WY Frontier Oil 0.01 1.00 0.09 0.15 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Big Spring 
Refinery 
TX Alon USA 0.01 1.00 0.11 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Valdez 
Refinery 
AK Petro Star 0.01 1.00 0.09 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
North Salt Lake 
Refinery 
UT Big West Oil 0.01 1.00 0.06 0.19 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Woods Cross 
Refinery 
UT Holly 
Corporation 
0.01 1.00 0.05 0.20 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Carson 
Refinery 
CA BP 0.01 1.00 0.48 0.02 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Long Beach 
Refinery 
CA Alon USA 0.01 1.00 0.05 0.17 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Princeton 
Refinery 
LA Calumet 
Lubricants 
0.14 1.00 0.01 0.06 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Tacoma 
Refinery 
WA US 
Oil&Refining 
0.01 1.00 0.06 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Gallup Refinery NM Western 
Refining 
0.01 1.00 0.05 0.15 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bakersfield 
Refinery 
CA Kern Oil 0.01 1.00 0.04 0.19 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bakersfield 
Refinery 
CA San Joaqin 
Refining Co 
0.01 1.00 0.04 0.19 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
El Segundo 
Refinery 
CA Chevron 0.01 1.00 0.48 0.01 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Superior 
Refinery 
WI Murphy Oil 0.01 1.00 0.06 0.11 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Evansville 
Refinery 
WY Little America 
Refining 
0.01 1.00 0.04 0.16 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Smackover 
Refinery 
AR Cross Oil 0.06 1.00 0.01 0.09 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bloomfield 
Refinery 
NM Western 
Refining 
0.01 1.00 0.03 0.16 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Kuparuk 
Refinery 
AK ConocoPhillips 0.01 1.00 0.03 0.15 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Woods Cross 
Refinery 
UT Silver Eagle 
Refining 
0.01 1.00 0.02 0.21 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Somersert 
Refinery 
KY Somerset 0.04 1.00 0.01 0.10 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
North Pole 
Refinery 
AK Petro Star 0.01 1.00 0.03 0.13 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Newell 
Refinery 
WV Ergon 0.01 1.00 0.03 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
South Gate 
Refinery 
CA Lunday 
Thagard 
0.01 1.00 0.02 0.18 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Santa Maria 
Refinery 
CA Greka Energy 0.01 1.00 0.02 0.18 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Ventura 
Refining and 
Transmission 
OK Ventura 0.01 1.00 0.03 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Mount Vernon 
Refinery 
IN Countrymark 
Co-op 
0.01 1.00 0.04 0.09 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Montana 
Refining Co 
MT Connacher 
Oil&Gas 
0.01 1.00 0.02 0.15 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Newcastle 
Refinery 
WY Wyoming 
Refining 
0.01 1.00 0.02 0.15 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Prudhoe Bay 
Refinery 
AK BP 0.01 1.00 0.02 0.15 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bradford 
Refinery 
PA American 
Refining 
0.01 1.00 0.02 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Evanston 
Refinery 
WY Silver Eagle 
Refining 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.21 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Oxnard 
Refinery 
CA Tenby Inc 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.20 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wilmington 
Asphalt 
Refinery 
CA Valero 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.18 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Eagle Refinery NV Foreland 
Refining 
0.01 1.00 0.01 0.16 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Delaware City 
Refinery 
DE PBF Energy 0.01 1.00 0.01 0.08 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lumberton 
Refinery 
MS Hunt 
Southland 
Refining 
0.25 1.00 0.01 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Texas City 
Refinery 
TX Marathon 
Petroleum 
0.40 1.00 0.13 0.00 0.91 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.00 
Port Allen 
Refinery 
LA Placid 
Refining 
0.32 1.00 0.09 0.00 0.91 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 
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Appendix D. Procedure Log 
Data Description 
Oil Refinery Data  
Available from Energy Information Administration Website  
http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/refinery_capacity_d
ata/current/table1.pdf (Accessed 6 June 2011) 
 Converted to Excel File for Import into GIS 
 Attributes:  City/State/Owner, Capacity (bbl/d and m3/d) 
Location:  E:\Refinery Layer.xlsx 
 
State Outline Shapefile 
 Available from U.S. Census Bureau 2010 TIGER/Line® Shapefiles  
 http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/geo/shapefiles2010/main (Accessed 6 June 2011) 
 Location:  E:\states.shp 
 
US Boundary Shapefile 
 Available through ArcGIS 9.2/9.3 Learning ArcGIS Desktop 
 Location: E:\USA Boundary.lyr 
 
Metadata 
State Outline Shapefile 
Projection:  GCS North American 1983 
Datum: D North American 1983 
Units: Decimal Degrees 
Key Attributes:  Region, Division, State ID, State Name, State Area, State Water  
Area, and Postal Two-Letter Abbreviation 
 
 USA Boundary Layer 
  Projection: GCS North American 1983 
  Datum: D North American 1983 
  Units: Decimal Degrees 
  Key Attributes: Polylines of US Boundary 
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Creating a Oil Refinery Layer 
1. Open ArcCatalog 10 and find the excel spreadsheet labeled refinerylayer.xlsx 
2. Double-click on the refinerylayer.xlsx 
3. Right-click on Sheet1$. 
4. Click Create a Feature Class  From x-y table. 
5. Inputs: 
a. X: Longitude 
b. Y: Latitude 
c. Z: N/A 
d. File Location: Enter desired location and name 
6. Shapefile will be created from excel spreadsheet.   
 
Adding Layers to ArcMap 10 
1.  Open a new map within ArcMap 10 and add states.shp layer to map. 
a. Right-click on Layers, Add Data, go to states.shp file. 
b. Click open. 
2. Repeat step for USA Boundary Layer.   
a. Right-click on Layers, Add Data, go to USA Boundary.lyr 
3. Repeat step for Oil Refinery Layer created above. 
a. Right-click on Layers, Add Data, go to refinery shapefile. 
b. Click open. 
 
Visual Analysis 
1. Right-click on oil refinery layer under Table of Contents and click on 
Properties. 
2. Select Symbology  Quantities  Graduated Symbols 
3. Inputs: 
a. Value: bbl_d 
b. Classification:  Natural (Jenks), Breaks = 3 
c. Redefine Breaks at 125,000, 250,000 and 375,000 
4. Select Red, Yellow, and Green for High, Medium, and Low Output Ranges 
5. Resize symbols to desired visual size. 
6. Visually inspect map to look for patterns. 
 
Moran’s I Analysis 
1. Under ArcToolbox, select Spatial Statistics ToolsAnalyzing Patterns. 
2. Double-click Spatial Autocorrelation (Moran’s I). 
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3. Inputs 
a. Input Feature Class: Refinery Layer 
b. Generate Report:  Check Box 
c. Input Feature:  bbl_d 
d. Conceptualization of Spatial Relationships: Inverse Distance 
e. Distance Method: Euclidean Distance 
f. Standardization: None 
g. Distance Band: None 
h. Weights Matrix File: N/A 
4. Click Run. 
5. View results under HTML ReportExport to .pdf to see graphics. 
 
Cluster and Outlier Analysis 
1. Under ArcToolbox, select Spatial Statistics ToolsMapping Clusters 
2. Double-click on Cluster and Outlier Analysis. 
3. Inputs 
a. Input Feature Class: Refinery Layer 
b. Input Field: bbl_d 
c. Output Feature Class:  Enter Desired File Name 
d. Conceptualization of Spatial Relationships: Inverse Distance 
e. Distance Method: Euclidean Distance 
f. Standardization: None 
g. Distance Band: None 
h. Weights Matrix File: N/A 
4. Click Run. 
5. View Results on new layer. 
 
Inverse Distance Weighting Map 
1. Repeat create layer after calculating risk in Microsoft Excel.   
2. Under ArcToolbox, select Spatial Analyst Tools  Interpolation 
3. Double-click on IDW. 
4. Inputs 
a. Input Point Features: Risk 
b. Z-value Field:  Risk 
c. Output Raster:  Enter Desired File Name 
d. Output Cell Size: 0.281298916 
e. Power: 2 
f. Distance: 3 
g. Minimum Number of Points: 6 
h. Input Barrier Polyline Features:  USA Boundary 
5. Click Run. 
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